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Introduction
This thesis challenges three views in international macroeconomics with important policy
implications. The first chapter asks how fiscal policy should be designed in a monetary
union and draws novel conclusions. The second chapter challenges the notion how nominal
exchange rates respond to exogenous interest rate changes under rational expectations. It
provides new empirical evidence and a theoretical explanation of this evidence. The third
chapter calls the view into question that the German current account surplus is too large
by rationalizing the surplus on the basis of a theoretical model. In what follows, I provide
a short summary of the main findings of each chapter.
Chapter 1 is based on joint work with Gernot Mu¨ller. In it we analyze to which
extent fiscal policy should be coordinated in a monetary union. According to the pre-crises
consensus there are separate domains for monetary and fiscal stabilization in a currency
union. While the common monetary policy takes care of union-wide fluctuations, fiscal
policies should be tailored to meet country-specific conditions. This separation is no longer
optimal, however, if monetary policy is constrained by an effective lower bound on interest
rates. Specifically, we show that in this case there are benefits from coordinating fiscal
policies across countries. By coordinating fiscal policies, policymakers are better able
to stabilize union-wide activity and inflation while avoiding detrimental movements of a
country’s terms of trade.
Chapter 2 is based on joint work with Gernot Mu¨ller and Martin Wolf. In it we revisit
Dornbusch (1976)’s exchange rate overshooting hypothesis. First, we use local projections
to estimate the response of the effective exchange rate of the US dollar to US monetary
policy shocks. Following a monetary contraction, the dollar undershoots: it appreciates on
impact, but less so than in the long run. Second, we develop and estimate a New Keynesian
model with information frictions. Market participants do not fully observe the natural rate
and attach probability to the scenario that the monetary policy shock represents in fact an
– 1 –
endogenous response to movements in the natural rate. As they learn over time the true
nature of the shock, the exchange rate continues to appreciate, as in the data.
Chapter 3 is based on joint work with Marc Faupel. In it we test whether the so called
intertemporal approach to the current account is able to explain German current account
data. For this purpose, we perform established present value tests of the intertemporal
model. We find that the cross-equation restrictions of the model cannot be rejected and
that the large current account surplus is predicted by the intertemporal model. Hence,
according to this benchmark the German current account surplus can be justified by the
intertemporal approach.
I hope that this thesis contributes to our understanding about how the economy works
and that it provides policymakers with helpful insights for their decision making.
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Chapter 1
Fiscal policy coordination in currency unions at
the effective lower bound
Joint with Gernot Mu¨ller
1.1 Introduction
In the wake of the global financial crisis, fiscal policy staged a comeback as a stabilization
tool. Figure 1.1 displays two rough measures of the discretionary fiscal stance, both for
the US and the euro area. The left panel shows the change of the cyclically adjusted
government budget deficit, measured in percentage-point changes relative to the pre-crisis
year 2007. The right panel shows the level of government consumption relative to trend
output. Both measures are indicative of an expansionary fiscal stance during the recession:
deficits rose sharply after 2007, as did government spending. It appears, however, that fiscal
stabilization has been used more timidly in the euro area: not only did deficits increase
less than in the US, government spending was also raised relatively less, given its higher
pre-crisis level.
One possible explanation is that euro-area fiscal policy is largely determined at the
country level, rather than at the union level and, hence, there may have been a failure
to coordinate fiscal stabilization across the member states of the euro area.1 In line with
this conjecture, there have been calls for stronger policy coordination, urging European
governments to engineer a larger fiscal expansion during 2008–09 (see, for instance, Krugman,
2008). For the same reason, the shift to austerity in the euro area after 2010 may have been
excessive, as argued by many observers (see, for instance, Cotarelli, 2012). Against this
background, we ask whether fiscal-stabilization policies should be coordinated across the
1To be sure, there has been an attempt to coordinate European fiscal stabilization policies, namely through
the European Economic Recovery Plan, discussed and legislated in 2008–09. According to Cwik and
Wieland (2011) the measures foreseen by the plan amounted to 1.04 and 0.86 percent of 2009 and 2010
GDP, respectively. Hence, they were considerably smaller than those due to US legislation under the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act which amounted to roughly 5 percent of GDP.
– 3 –
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Figure 1.1: Cyclically adjusted deficit (annual observations, change relative to 2007, mea-
sured in percentage points of potential output) and government consumption of general
government (in units of trend output, quarterly observations); solid lines: Euro area (EA),
dashed lines: United Staates (US); source: OECD Economic Outlook.
member states of a currency union with a view towards stabilizing area-wide activity and
inflation.
According to the pre-crises consensus fiscal stabilization should be geared towards
country-specific conditions, because the common monetary policy can take care of union-
wide fluctuations (Beetsma and Jensen, 2005; Kirsanova et al., 2007; Gal´ı and Monacelli,
2008).2 The recent economic and financial crises have exposed a shortcoming of this
paradigm: in a severe economic downturn monetary policy may be constrained by an
effective lower bound (ELB) on nominal interest rates and thus be unable to stabilize
fluctuations at the union level. Moreover, it is precisely under these circumstances that
fiscal policy is very effective in stabilizing economic activity (Christiano et al., 2011;
Woodford, 2011).
In our analysis we therefore explicitly account for the possibility that an ELB constrains
2Earlier contributions also allow for the possibility that the objectives of monetary and fiscal policy differ.
This does not necessarily strengthen the case for coordination (Dixit and Lambertini, 2003). In fact, fiscal
coordination may even be harmful (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1998). Dixit and Lambertini (2001) offer
some qualifications as well as further references.
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monetary policy. We do so within the framework of Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008). It specifies
a currency union which consists of a continuum of small open economies, each negligible
in terms of aggregate outcomes. Yet as countries specialize in the production of a specific
set of goods, domestic policies—if enacted unilaterally—will generally impact a country’s
terms of trade. In the absence of policy coordination, the optimal policy will therefore be
conducted with a view towards its effect on the terms of trade. Instead, by coordinating
on a common policy, countries can internalize this “terms-of-trade externality”.3 Hence,
optimal policies will generally differ depending on whether there is coordination across
countries or not.
In terms of country-specific policies, we focus on government spending. We assume
that the government purchases only domestically produced goods, financed by taxes levied
on domestic households. We consider a representative household in each country which
supplies labor and trades a complete set of state-contingent assets across countries. Its
consumption basket includes goods produced in all countries of the union, but is biased
towards domestically produced goods. Goods, in turn, are produced in a monopolistic
competitive environment and firms are restricted in their ability to adjust prices. In “normal”
(or pre-crisis) times monetary policy is able to perfectly stabilize inflation and output at
the union level: there is no need for fiscal coordination across countries. We contrast this
situation with a “crisis scenario” where monetary policy is unable to lower interest rates
sufficiently in response to a union-wide contractionary shock, because it is constrained by
an ELB.4
We determine the optimal discretionary adjustment of government spending in the crisis
scenario. Under coordination fiscal policies are set to maximize union-wide welfare. In the
absence of coordination each fiscal policymaker maximizes country-specific welfare. We
find that—in line with the conjecture above—countries provide too little stimulus at the
ELB in the absence of coordination. Intuitively, local policymakers are keen to avoid the
terms of trade appreciating too much with higher spending, as this lowers the demand
for domestically produced goods at times of economic slack. Conversely, the increase of
government spending is higher under coordination, because policymakers anticipate that
3See Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Benigno and Benigno (2003), De Paoli (2009) and Forlati (2015) for
different perspectives on the terms-of-trade externality in the context of monetary policy.
4We abstract from non-conventional policies such as forward guidance (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003) or
credit policies by the central bank (see, e.g., Cu´rdia and Woodford, 2011). These policies are arguably an
imperfect substitute for conventional policies, if only because they are not very well understood and hence
controversial (see, e.g., Rogoff, 2016; Giannoni et al., 2016).
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the terms of trade remain unaffected by a policy response which is common across countries.
At the same time, such a response is expected to boost union-wide inflation (rather than
an individual country’s terms of trade). This is desirable at the ELB, because expected
inflation lowers the real interest rate. We illustrate that the fiscal stimulus gap due to the
lack of coordination can be quantitatively significant.
This result is specific to currency unions, as a comparison with Cook and Devereux
(2011) makes clear. Their analysis characterizes optimal cooperative fiscal policies in a
two-country model while assuming that the exchange rate is flexible. Cook and Devereux
find that, even as the ELB binds, “there is little case for coordinated global fiscal expansion.”
In their environment a fiscal expansion in one country generates negative output spillovers
if the ELB binds and, in sharp contrast to our results, depreciates the domestic terms of
trade. Intuitively, higher domestic demand raises inflation and lowers real interest rates in
the domestic economy if monetary policy is constrained by the ELB. The nominal exchange
rate, if free to adjust, depreciates. This, in turn, more than offsets the effect of higher
domestic prices on the terms of trade and reduces the need for coordination.5
Our main focus is on discretionary policies, because if policymakers are able to commit,
monetary policy is well equipped to stabilize the economy even if it is temporarily constrained
by the ELB (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003). As a result, the ELB is less of an issue and
the benefits from fiscal stabilization are small, as Schmidt (2013) shows in a closed-economy
context.6 However, as a benchmark we also compute the optimal fiscal policy response
assuming both coordination and commitment.7 In this case, because we consider a common
shock in a perfectly symmetric currency union, the solution is identical to what one would
obtain for a closed-economy model. For the case of discretion, we find that there are sizeable
benefits from coordinating the fiscal response to the crisis. Moreover, in our analysis these
benefits are not offset by credibility problems which may arise under discretion and can
be amplified under international policy coordination (Rogoff, 1985). This is because we
5Cook and Devereux (2013) discuss in detail the “perverse response” of relative prices at the ELB. Corsetti
et al. (2017) offer a systematic comparison of the terms of trade response to government spending in a
small open economy: higher spending appreciates the terms of trade under a peg, but depreciates them
under flexible exchange rates if monetary policy is constrained by the ELB. However, they do not study
optimal fiscal policy.
6In principle one may assume that monetary policy is unable to commit, but that fiscal policy is able to do
so. As Werning (2012) notes, because of decision and implementation lags, there is an aspect of inherent
commitment to fiscal policy. It might be of limited practical relevance, however, because supplements to
the budget or mid-year budgets are frequently implemented (Perotti, 2004).
7We compute the solution on the basis of the algorithm put forward by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
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study policy responses around a steady state from which discretionary policymakers have
no temptation to deviate. Within our framework we also recoup two results which have
already been established in the literature, but are crucial to put our main result into
perspective. First, we confirm an earlier finding of Turnovsky (1988) and Devereux (1991):
absent coordination policymakers choose too high a level of government spending in steady
state. This is because governments seek to improve (that is, appreciate) their country’s
terms of trade through purchases of domestically produced goods.8 Hence, in steady state
the terms-of-trade externality has the opposite effect than in the crisis scenario, because
stronger terms of trade are beneficial in the long run, as the economy operates at full
capacity.
Second, we also contrast government spending multipliers, that is, the percentage change
of domestic output given a (possibly non-optimal) increase of government spending by one
percent of GDP in the entire union and in the domestic economy only. In line with earlier
work by Fahri and Werning (2016), we find that the multiplier is larger than unity in the
first case, provided the ELB binds, but smaller than unity in the second case. This result
obtains because a unilateral increase of government spending appreciates the terms of trade
and thus crowds out private expenditure. Instead, the cooperative policy, common to all
countries, raises expected inflation at the union level, thus crowding-in private expenditure
at the ELB.9
Our analysis also relates to a number of other recent studies. Blanchard et al. (2016)
calibrate a two-country model to capture key features of the euro area, notably of its core
and periphery. They show through model simulations that increasing government spending
in the core generates significant welfare gains. Evers (2015) studies the performance of
alternative fiscal arrangements in a quantitative model of a currency union. He finds that
a centralized fiscal authority dominates a regime of fiscal transfers as well as a regime
of decentralized fiscal decision making. Other work has focused on the coordination of
8Epifani and Gancia (2009) find that this mechanism may account for the size of the public sector in open
economies. In particular, their findings suggest that the terms-of-trade externality rather than a demand
for insurance causes the public sector to grow with trade openness. Chari and Kehoe (1990) stress that the
behavior of cooperative and non-cooperative fiscal policies converge as countries’ market power goes to
zero. In our setup countries retain market power even though we consider a continuum of small economies.
9An alternative perspective emphasizes monetary conditions: at the country level there is a de facto target
for the price level, given by purchasing power parity. Any inflationary impulse due to fiscal policy thus
triggers an offsetting deflationary tendency and causes the long term real interest rate to rise on impact
(Corsetti et al., 2013a). At the union level, absent a price level target, the inflationary impulse due to
higher government spending reduces real interest rates at the ELB.
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debt and deficit policies in currency unions (Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999; Krogstrup and
Wyplosz, 2010). We abstract from this aspect, as Ricardian equivalence obtains in our
model. Moreover, we stress that our analysis disregards complications due to sovereign risk.
However, both aspects are likely to further strengthen the case for coordination in currency
unions stuck at the ELB (Corsetti et al., 2014).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 1.2 we describe the basic
setup of the model. It also contrasts government spending multipliers at the union and the
country level, once the ELB binds. In Section 1.3 we analyze the need for coordination
by determining optimal government spending with and without coordination. Section 1.4
provides a quantitative assessment. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Model
Our analysis is based on the model of Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008). There is a currency
union which consists of a continuum of countries, each a small open economy indexed by
i ∈ [0, 1]. Each economy features a representative household, a continuum of monopolistically
competitive firms and a fiscal authority. Monetary policy is conducted at the union level.
We consider two dimensions which are absent in Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008). First, we
allow for the possibility that the ELB constrains monetary policy because of a union-
wide contractionary shock. Second, we compute optimal fiscal policies when there is no
coordination across countries.10 Our exposition focuses on the model structure in terms of
preferences and technology. In a second step, we state the linearized equilibrium conditions
at the country and the union level. Readers may consult Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008) for
further details on the derivations.
1.2.1 Model structure
In what follows we briefly outline the problem of households, the fiscal authority, firms
and monetary policy.
10Forlati (2009) also analyzes optimal fiscal policy in the absence of coordination within the Gal´ı-Monacelli
model. Her focus is on the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy without considering an ELB.
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Households
A representative household in country i has preferences over private consumption, Cit ,
public consumption, Git, and labor, N
i
t , given by
U(Cit , N
i
t , G
i
t) = (1− χ) logCit + χ logGit −
(
N it
)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
,
where parameter χ ∈ (0, 1) determines the relative weights of private and public consumption.
ϕ > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Private consumption is a
composite of domestically produced goods, Cii,t, and imported goods, C
i
F,t:
Cit ≡
(
Cii,t
)1−α (
CiF,t
)α
(1− α)1−α αα .
Parameter α ∈ (0, 1) measures the openness of the economy. Because country i has zero
weight in the union, α < 1 implies that there is home bias in consumption which accounts
for deviations from purchasing power parity in the short run. Domestically produced goods
are a CES basket of product varieties:
Cii,t ≡
 1∫
0
Cii,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj

ε
ε−1
, with ε > 1. (1.1)
Here Cii,t(j) denotes country i’s consumption of variety j ∈ [0, 1] produced in country i.
Parameter ε > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of goods
produced within each country. Consumption of imported goods, in turn, is defined as
follows:
CiF,t ≡ exp
1∫
0
cif,tdf,
with cif,t ≡ logCif,t and f ∈ [0, 1]. The index Cif,t is defined analogously to (1.1), with an
appropriate normalization (Gal´ı and Monacelli, 2015).
Given the definitions above, minimizing expenditures gives rise to demand functions for
9
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product varieties. For instance, domestic demand for generic good j is given by
Cii,t(j) =
(
P it (j)
P it
)−ε
Cii,t,
where P it (j) is the price of good j and P
i
t ≡
(∫ 1
0 P
i
t (j)
1−dj
) 1
1−
is the domestic (producer)
price index. Country-i demand for a generic country-f good j, that is Cif,t(j), is given
analogously as well as the producer price index in country f , that is P ft .
The optimal allocation between domestic and foreign goods requires
Cii,t = (1− α)
(
P it
P ic,t
)−1
Cit , C
i
F,t = α
(
P ∗t
P ic,t
)−1
Cit ,
where P ∗t ≡ exp
∫ 1
0 p
f
t df is the union-wide price index with p
f
t ≡ logP ft . The consumer price
index (CPI) is given by P ic,t ≡ (P it )1−α(P ∗t )α. In the following we focus on the producer
price index, P it , which is related to the CPI according to P
i
t = P
i
c,t(S
i
t)
α, where Sit ≡ P ∗t /P it
denotes the terms of trade.
Households trade a complete set of state-contingent securities which provides insurance
against country-specific shocks.11 They maximize expected discounted lifetime utility
subject to a sequence of budget constraints:
max
{Cit ,N it ,Ait}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Cit , N
i
t , G
i
t)
s.t. P ic,tC
i
t + Et{Qt,t+1Ait+1} ≤ Ait +W itN it + P it − T it .
where Ait denotes the portfolio of nominal assets and Qt,t+1 is the nominal stochastic
discount factor (common across countries). Ponzi schemes are not permitted. W it is the
nominal wage and P it are firm profits, rebated to households in a lump-sum fashion. T it
are lump-sum taxes. We consider the case of distortinary taxes in Section 1.4.3 below.
Parameter β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor.
11For instance, idiosyncratic technology shocks as in Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008). As we analyze optimal
policy in response to an aggregate shock that pushes the currency union at the ELB we abstract from
country-specific shocks in our analysis.
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Fiscal authority
Public consumption is composed of domestically produced goods as in (1.1) and the
fiscal authority allocates expenditures in a cost minimizing manner. The resulting demand
function for a generic good j is given by:
Git(j) =
(
P it (j)
P it
)−ε
Git.
Aggregate expenditure, Git, remains to be determined below. Taxes adjust to balance the
budget in each period:
T it = P
i
tG
i
t + τ
iW itN
i
t . (1.2)
where τ i is a (constant) employment subsidy paid to domestic firms. If set appropriately it
ensures the efficiency of the steady state under monopolistic competition.
Firms
In each country, there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms, each of
which produces a differentiated good Y it (j). These goods are traded across countries and
the law of one price is assumed to hold. Firms cannot adjust their price P it (j) every period.
Instead, as in Calvo (1983), they may reset prices in a given period with probability 1− θ,
while their current price remains in effect with probability θ ∈ (0, 1). The probability
of resetting the price is independent of the last adjustment. Firms hire labor N it (j) and
produce with a linear technology Y it (j) = N
i
t (j) in order to satisfy the level of demand at a
given price. The objective of a generic firm j ∈ [0, 1] is to maximize discounted, expected
nominal payoffs taking the demand for its product into account. The optimization problem
is given by:
max
P¯ it (j)
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
{
Qt,t+kY
i
t+k(j)(P¯
i
t (j)− (1− τ i)W it+k)
}
s.t. Y it+k(j) =
(
P¯ it (j)
P it+k
)−ε
Y it+k,
where P¯ it (j) is the optimal price, set in period t.
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Monetary policy
Monetary policy is conducted at the union level. The policy instrument is the nominal
interest rate, that is, the yield on a nominally riskless one-period discount bond: 1 + i∗t ≡
1
Et{Qt,t+1} . The objective of monetary policy is to maintain price stability, that is, zero
inflation at the union level.12 Importantly, monetary policy may be constrained by an ELB.
Specifically, in what follows we assume that i∗t ≥ 0, that is, we assume the effective lower
bound to be zero. While the actual lower bound is arguably somewhat below zero, this is
of little consequence in the context of our analysis. Below we specify an interest-rate rule
which implements price stability subject to the ELB constraint.
1.2.2 Equilibrium conditions for approximate model
We consider a log-linear approximation to the optimality and market-clearing conditions
around a symmetric, zero-inflation steady state. We use hats to denote log-deviations of a
variable from its steady-state value. For a generic variable Xt we define xt ≡ logXt and
xˆt = log(Xt/X). Union-wide variables are obtained by integrating over all countries in the
union: xˆ∗t =
∫ 1
0 xˆ
i
tdi.
First, goods-market clearing and integrating over all goods gives for country i
yˆit = (1− γ)(cˆit + αsit) + γgˆit. (1.3)
Parameter γ denotes the steady-state ratio of government consumption to output. The
above equation links domestic output yˆit to domestic consumption cˆ
i
t, the terms of trade s
i
t
and domestic government spending gˆit. Further, the assumption of complete markets gives
rise to the following risk sharing condition:
cˆit = cˆ
∗
t + (1− α)sit. (1.4)
Combining it with (1.3) gives
yˆit = γgˆ
i
t + (1− γ)cˆ∗t + (1− γ)sit. (1.5)
Integrating equation (1.5) over all countries i ∈ [0, 1] and noting that ∫ 10 sitdi = 0 leads to
12In the context of our model this is the optimal discretionary policy under fiscal coordination.
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the union-wide market clearing condition
yˆ∗t = γgˆ
∗
t + (1− γ)cˆ∗t . (1.6)
Combining (1.5) and (1.6), we can rewrite market clearing at the country level as follows:
yˆit − yˆ∗t = γ(gˆit − gˆ∗t ) + (1− γ)sit. (1.7)
Integrating country-specific Euler equations over all countries i ∈ [0, 1] and combining it
with (1.6) yields a union-wide dynamic IS curve:
yˆ∗t = Et{yˆ∗t+1} − (1− γ)(i∗t − Et{pi∗t+1} − rt)− γEt{gˆ∗t+1}+ γgˆ∗t (1.8)
with rt ≡ − log β −∆t. As in Woodford (2011), ∆t denotes a spread between the interest
rate set by the central bank and the one relevant for private sector decisions. It reflects
frictions in financial intermediation which we do not model explicitly, but permit to vary
exogenously.13 If this spread becomes large enough, monetary policy becomes constrained
by the ELB. In what follows, we assume that monetary policy follows a Taylor rule unless
it is constrained by the ELB. Specifically, we posit the following:
i∗t = max {rt + φpipi∗t , 0} . (1.9)
We restrict φpi > 1. By following this rule monetary policy fully stabilizes inflation and
output at the union level (as long as gˆ∗t = 0), unless it is constrained by the ELB.
Optimal price-setting behavior of firms implies the following variant of the New Keynesian
Phillips curve:
piit = βEt{piit+1}+ λ
(
1
1− γ + ϕ
)
yˆit −
λγ
1− γ gˆ
i
t, (1.10)
with λ ≡ (1−βθ)(1−θ)θ and where piit = pit − pit−1 denotes the inflation rate. Integrating
13Cu´rdia and Woodford (2016) provide a microfoundation in a model which accounts for household
heterogeneity and borrowing and lending across households.
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equation (1.10) over all countries i ∈ [0, 1] gives the union-wide Phillips curve:
pi∗t = βEt{pi∗t+1}+ λ
(
1
1− γ + ϕ
)
yˆ∗t −
λγ
1− γ gˆ
∗
t . (1.11)
From the definition of the terms of trade it follows that
piit = pi
∗
t − sit + sit−1. (1.12)
Further, we note that equilibrium conditions (1.7) and (1.10)-(1.12) imply the following
second order stochastic difference equation for the terms of trade (see Gal´ı and Monacelli,
2005b)
sit = ωs
i
t−1 + ωβEt{sit+1} − ωλϕγ(gˆit − gˆ∗t ),
where ω ≡ 11+β+λ[1+ϕ(1−γ)] ∈ [0, 11+β ). The above equation has a unique stable solution
sit = δs
i
t−1 + δλϕγ
∞∑
k=0
(βδ)kEt{gˆ∗t+k − gˆit+k}, (1.13)
with δ ≡ 1−
√
1−4βω2
2ωβ ∈ (0, 1).
Definition of equilibrium. Given initial conditions (s−1) as well as {∆t}∞t=0 an equi-
librium is a collection of
1. country-specific stochastic processes {yˆit, piit, sit}∞t=0 for all i ∈ [0, 1]
2. union-wide stochastic processes {yˆ∗t , pi∗t }∞t=0 with yˆ∗t =
∫ 1
0 yˆ
i
tdi and pi
∗
t =
∫ 1
0 pi
i
tdi
such that for given {gˆit}∞t=0 for all i ∈ [0, 1] with gˆ∗t =
∫ 1
0 gˆ
i
tdi and the path for the nominal
interest rate {i∗t }∞t=0 determined by (1.9)
3. equilibrium conditions (1.7), (1.10) and (1.12) are satisfied for each country i and
4. equilibrium conditions (1.8) and (1.11) are satisfied on the union level.
Effective-lower-bound (or “crisis”) scenario. In our analysis below, we consider
a scenario where the ELB binds because the interest rate spread increases temporarily.
14
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Specifically, as in Woodford (2011), we assume a Markov structure for ∆t. It rises temporarily
to a value ∆L such that rL < 0. The shock remains operative with probability µ and
is sufficiently large for the ELB to become binding. Once the shock disappears there
are no more future ELB episodes.14 Formally, equation (1.9) implies that i∗t = 0 for as
long as the shock lasts, independently on the conduct of fiscal policy.15 With probability
1 − µ the spread disappears (and thus the whole economy returns permanently to the
steady state). Moreover, defining κ ≡ λ
(
1
1−γ + ϕ
)
, we impose the parametric restriction
(1 − µ)(1 − βµ) > (1 − γ)µκ for the equilibrium to be uniquely determined (Woodford,
2011).
1.2.3 Impact multipliers: union-wide vs country-specific fiscal impulse
In this section, to set the stage for our main results in Section 1.3, we solve for the
government spending multiplier on output. That is, we determine by how much country-
specific output changes, given an increase of government consumption by one percent
of output. Our focus is on how the multiplier differs depending on whether there is a
union-wide or a country-specific variation of government consumption. As a union-wide
fiscal impulse impacts the individual countries symmetrically, this scenario is equivalent to
the closed-economy setting in Woodford (2011). Instead, a country-specific fiscal impulse
impacts domestic output directly, but also indirectly via the terms of trade. This scenario
is thus equivalent to the small-open-economy settings in Corsetti et al. (2013a) and Fahri
and Werning (2016). We briefly revisit their results within our framework.
Consider first the union-wide fiscal impulse in the ELB scenario. We assume that
government spending is increased in every country by the same amount as long as the ELB
remains binding. In this case, given the assumptions spelled out above, union-wide variables
take a constant value x∗L, as long as the shock persists und the union-wide Phillips curve
14Assuming such an absorbing state ensures the tractability of the model and allows us to derive closed-form
results for discretionary policies, because in this case the economy only visits two states: the ELB state
and the steady state. Adam and Billi (2006, 2007) compute optimal (monetary) policy while allowing the
ELB to bind occasionally.
15Schmidt (2013) and Erceg and Linde´ (2014) consider endogenous exit from the ELB due to fiscal-policy
measures. We assume instead that the decline of rt is sufficiently large for the ELB to remain binding also
in the presence of optimal fiscal stabilization.
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and the IS equation simplify to
pi∗L =
1
1− βµκ
(
yˆ∗L −
σ¯γ
σ¯ + ϕ
gˆ∗L
)
, (1.14)
(1− µ)(yˆ∗L − γgˆ∗L) = (1− γ)µpi∗L + (1− γ)rL, (1.15)
with σ¯ ≡ 11−γ .
We solve the above system for yˆ∗L as a function of rL and gˆ
∗
L. This gives:
yˆ∗L =
(1− γ)(1− βµ)
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− (1− γ)µκrL +
(1− µ)(1− βµ)γ − (1− γ)µκ γσ¯σ¯+ϕ
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− (1− γ)µκ gˆ
∗
L. (1.16)
In order to determine the multiplier, we divide the derivative of yˆ∗L with respect to gˆ
∗
L
by the steady-state share of government spending, γ:
1
γ
∂yˆ∗L
∂gˆ∗L
=
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− (1− γ)µκ σ¯σ¯+ϕ
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− (1− γ)µκ ≥ 1.
At the union level, we thus find that the multiplier is bounded from below by unity
(Woodford, 2011). Intuitively, higher government spending reduces real interest rates at the
ELB, because the expected inflationary impact of higher spending is not matched by higher
nominal interest rates. Hence, private-sector spending is crowded in.
We now turn to the effect of a country-specific fiscal impulse. In this case, we set
union-wide variables to zero and to ensure comparability with the union-wide fiscal impulse
we assume that government spending in country i follows a two-state Markov switching
process. Initially, government spending exceeds its steady state level gˆiL > 0; it does so with
probability µ in the next period too and returns to steady state with probability 1− µ.
Specifically, equations (1.7) and (1.13), evaluated in the impact period of the spending
increase read as follows
yˆi1 = γgˆ
i
L − (1− γ)pi1
pi1 =
δλϕγ
1− βδµgˆ
i
L.
Combining both equations, we obtain the government spending multiplier in the impact
16
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period.16 It is given by
1
γ
∂yˆi1
∂gˆiL
= 1− (1− γ) δλϕ
1− βδµ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≤ 1.
The upper bound of unity is reached when prices are completely sticky (λ → 0). To
the extent that prices are somewhat flexible, private-sector spending at the country level is
crowded out by higher government consumption. Its inflationary impact appreciates the
terms of trade which, in turn, calls for reduced consumption in country i, see equation (1.4).
Equivalently, (relative) purchasing power parity requires that the price level reverts back to
its pre-shock level in the long run. Given unchanged nominal interest rates in the currency
union, future deflation induces long-term real interest rates to rise on impact. Still, the
crowding-out effect of a country-specific stimulus in a currency union is limited relative to
when the country operates a flexible exchange rate system. In other words, the multiplier
is larger under a fixed exchange rate than under flexible exchange rates (see, for further
discussion and evidence, Corsetti et al., 2013a; Born et al., 2013).
Taken together, we obtain the following ranking of the government spending multiplier
on country-specific output, considering a union-wide and country-specific spending increase,
respectively:
1
γ
dyˆi1
dgˆiL
≤ 1 ≤ 1
γ
dyˆ∗L
dgˆ∗L
.
Fahri and Werning (2016) obtain this result as a closed-form solution of the continuous-time
version of the New Keynesian model.17
16Because a country-specific fiscal impulse impacts the terms of trade, the output effect of government
spending changes over time even though the size of the impulse does not. We focus on the impact effect.
17Erceg and Linde´ (2012) also compute spending multipliers for a small open economy. Assuming an
exchange rate peg, they show that multipliers are always below unity. For the case of flexible exchange
rates, they stress that at the ELB the multiplier exceeds unity only if prices are sufficiently flexible. To
account for this finding note that, in contrast to us, they do not assume that government spending is
raised only for as long as the ELB binds. Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), in turn, show that multipliers
are high within a currency union when compared to the multiplier at the union level in the absence of a
binding ELB constraint. Acconcia et al. (2014) find for Italian data that variations in local government
spending have fairly strong output effects.
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1.3 Optimal policy
We now turn to optimal fiscal policy. In particular, we distinguish between a scenario
of coordination and one without, both with regards to the steady state and to the ELB
scenario. In each case, policymakers chose government consumption in order to maximize
household welfare.
1.3.1 Steady state
We consider optimal fiscal policy in the steady state first. We compute the symmetric
steady state as the solution to the social planner problem and discuss how it can be
decentralized.
Under coordination the social planner (of the union) maximizes union-wide welfare
subject to the production function and the goods-market-clearing condition. Formally, we
have
max
1∫
0
(
(1− χ) logCi + χ logGi −
(
N i
)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
di (1.17)
s.t. Y i = N i
Y i = Cii +
1∫
0
Cfi df +G
i,
for all i ∈ [0, 1] where Cfi denotes country f ’s consumption of goods produced in country
i. In addition, optimality requires that varieties are produced and consumed in equal
quantities in each country (which is already assumed in the above constraints). Solving
the planner problem gives rise to the following steady-state relations (for each country
i ∈ [0, 1]), see Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008):
γC ≡
(
G
Y
)C
= χ; Y C = 1, (1.18)
where index C refers to the case of coordination. The social planner solution can be
decentralized as a symmetric, zero-inflation steady state by letting the government provide
public goods according to (1.18) and by setting the labor subsidy to offset distortions due
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to monopolistic competition:
τC =
1
ε
.
We now turn to the case without coordination. Here, the social planner (in a given
country i) maximizes domestic welfare only, subject to the production function, the market-
clearing condition and the risk-sharing condition. In this regard, the planner in country
i is subject to the same constraints vis-a`-vis the rest of the union as is country i in a
decentralized equilibrium (Gal´ı and Monacelli, 2005a). The planner also takes consumption
in the rest of the union C∗ as given. Formally, we have
max (1− χ) logCi + χ logGi −
(
N i
)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
(1.19)
s.t. Y i = N i
Y i = Ci(Si)α +Gi
Ci = C∗(Si)1−α.
Again, in an optimal allocation varieties are produced and consumed in equal quantities
in a given country. In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, optimality requires the following to
hold in every country i ∈ [0, 1], see Appendix 1.A.1:
γN ≡
(
G
Y
)N
=
χ
(1− α)(1− χ) + χ ∈ (0, 1) (1.20)
Y N = [(1− α)(1− χ) + χ] 11+ϕ ,
where index N refers to the case of no coordination. Comparing the outcome under
coordination and without, we observe that the government-consumption-to-output ratio is
higher in the latter case: γN > γC . Furthermore, the level of government spending without
coordination exceeds the level under coordination: GN > GC , even though output is lower
Y N < Y C , see also Appendix 1.A.1.
This confirms earlier findings by Turnovsky (1988) and Devereux (1991) according to
which government consumption without coordination accounts for an excessively large share
of output. Intuitively, each government tries to improve the domestic terms of trade by
increasing domestic demand. In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, however, the terms of trade
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are equal to unity. Government consumption is higher and output is lower relative to the
case of coordination. Because of the terms-of-trade externality, the steady state in the
absence of coordination is inefficient: welfare is lower than in case of coordination.
The social planner solution in the absence of coordination can be decentralized as a
symmetric, zero-inflation steady state by letting the government provide public goods
according to (1.20) and by choosing the following labor subsidy, see Appendix 1.A.2:
1− τN =
(
1− 1
ε
)
(1− α)−1.
Here, as explained by Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005a), the optimal employment subsidy offsets
the combined effects of market power and the terms of trade distortion such that the flexible
price equilibrium allocation is optimal (from the viewpoint of the social planner in the
absence of coordination). Hence, in our analysis below, there is no average inflation (or
deflation) bias. Finally, zero inflation ensures that the same amount of each variety is
produced and consumed.
1.3.2 Effective lower bound
In order to determine the optimal discretionary fiscal policy at the ELB, we pursue a
linear-quadratic approach. First, we approximate household welfare up to second order. In
the case of coordination we approximate the welfare function as well as the equilibrium con-
ditions around the steady state with coordination. Instead, in the case without coordination
we approximate around the steady state without coordination. In fact, Gal´ı and Monacelli
(2008) already provide an approximation of household welfare for the case of coordination.
We provide details on the derivation in the absence of coordination in Appendix 1.B.18
Second, we determine the optimal discretionary fiscal policy as we maximize the welfare
functions subject to the equilibrium conditions, once approximated around the steady state
with coordination and once without.19
Consider first the case of coordination. Here we focus on the symmetric solution, that
is, xit = x
∗
t for all i ∈ [0, 1], because we analyze the effects of a union-wide shock and
18In the absence of coordination there are linear terms in a second-order approximation to household
utility. We follow the approach of Benigno and Woodford (2006) and substitute for these terms using a
second-order approximation to the market-clearing condition.
19Clarida et al. (2002) also compare optimal (monetary) policy under coordination and without, each
evaluated around the respective steady state.
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assume that countries are identical. Under coordination the single policymaker maximizes
union-wide welfare by choosing government consumption in a discretionary way subject to
the New Keynesian Phillips curve, (1.11), and an inequality constraint which consolidates
the dynamic IS equation, (1.8) and the interest-rate rule (1.9). Hence, optimization is
subject to the ELB. Formally, assuming discretionary policy making, the optimization
problem is given by
max
pi∗t ,yˆ∗t ,gˆ∗t
W∗t ' −
1
2
(
ε
λ
(pi∗t )
2 + (1 + ϕ)(yˆ∗t )
2 +
γC
1− γC (gˆ
∗
t − yˆ∗t )2
)
(1.21)
s.t. pi∗t = λ
(
1
1− γC + ϕ
)
yˆ∗t −
λγC
1− γC gˆ
∗
t + ν
∗
0,t
yˆ∗t ≤ γC gˆ∗t + ν∗1,t,
where ν∗0,t and ν∗1,t collect expectation terms which are beyond the control of the policy
maker under discretion. In the expression above the welfare function features in addition to
inflation and the output term a fiscal gap, that is, the deviation of the spending-to-output
ratio from steady state. In Appendix 1.C we show that the solution to (1.21) requires
pi∗t = yˆ∗t = gˆ∗t = 0 as long as the monetary authority is not constrained by the ELB. Hence,
in this case the economy is perfectly stabilized at the steady state and the government-
consumption-to-output ratio is at its efficient level. When the ELB is binding, however,
pi∗t = yˆ∗t = gˆ∗t = 0 is no longer feasible. In that case we find that optimal government
spending is characterized by the following condition:
pi∗,Ct +
1
ε
yˆ∗,Ct = −ψCg gˆ∗,Ct , (1.22)
where ψCg ≡ 1εϕ > 0, see case 2 in Appendix 1.C. Intuitively, as long as output and inflation
drop in the crisis scenario (left-hand-side in the expression above), the optimal policy is
to raise government spending. The following proposition states the solution for optimal
government spending.
Proposition 1. Given the effective-lower-bound scenario under consideration (see Section
1.2.2), the optimal response of government spending under coordination, measured in
percentage deviations from the steady state with coordination, gˆ∗,CL , is given by:
gˆ∗,CL = −ΘCrL > 0,
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with
ΘC ≡ (1− γ
C)
(
κCε+ (1− βµ))
εψCg Γ
C
1 + (1− µ)γCλϕε+ γCΓC2
> 0,
where κC ≡ λ
(
1
1−γC + ϕ
)
, ΓC1 ≡ (1−µ)(1−βµ)−(1−γC)µκC and ΓC2 ≡ (1−µ)(1−βµ)−µλ
and ΓC1 ,Γ
C
2 > 0 because of the assumption of a uniquely determined equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix 1.D. 
Hence, we find that it is optimal to raise government spending under coordination, once
the ELB binds. The increase of government spending is time-invariant in the crisis scenario
because of the Markov structure of the shock. Once the ELB ceases to bind, the economy
returns to steady state. Our result is in line with Woodford (2011), because in the present
context the currency union under coordination is isomorphic to his closed-economy model.
We now turn to optimal government spending in the absence of coordination. In this
case, policy choices may differ across countries from an ex-ante perspective and, hence,
are expected to impact a country’s terms of trade. Given price stickiness, the terms of
trade adjust sluggishly in a currency union and hence the (lagged) terms of trade are an
endogenous state variable.20 As a result, the policy problem is inherently dynamic—even
under discretion. In this case, even though a policymaker may not directly steer private-
sector expectations, current policy decisions impact expectations indirectly via endogenous
state variables—an effect which is internalized by the policymaker (see, e.g., Svensson,
1997). We further note that, since the local policymaker takes union-wide variables as
given, including the nominal interest rate, the union-wide IS curve is not a constraint for
the decision maker and neither is the ELB. Instead, optimization is subject to the market-
clearing-cum-risk-sharing condition, (1.7), the country-specific New Keynesian Phillips
curve, (1.10), and the evolution of the terms of trade, (1.12). Specifically, under discretion
20The sluggish adjustment of the terms of trade has been identified as a key determinant of the macroeconomic
adjustment mechanism in monetary unions. Benigno (2004) and Pappa (2004) stress how it distorts the
adjustment. Groll and Monacelli (2016), in contrast, relate it to the “intrinsic benefits of monetary unions”
in the absence of commitment.
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the optimization problem is given by
V (sit−1, pi
∗
t , yˆ
∗
t , gˆ
∗
t ) = max
piit,yˆ
i
t,gˆ
i
t,s
i
t
[
−1
2
(
ε
λ
(piit)
2 + (1 + ϕ)(yˆit)
2 +
γN
1− γN
(
gˆit − yˆit
)2)
+ βEtV (s
i
t, pi
∗
t+1, yˆ
∗
t+1, gˆ
∗
t+1)
]
(1.23)
s.t. yˆit =yˆ
∗
t + γ
N (gˆit − gˆ∗t ) + (1− γN )sit
piit =βEt{piit+1}+ λ
(
1
1− γN + ϕ
)
yˆit −
λγN
1− γN gˆ
i
t
piit =pi
∗
t − sit + sit−1
and Et{piit+1} given.
In the expression above V is the value function. The solution to (1.23) requires the following
(consolidated) first-order condition to be satisfied (see Appendix 1.E):
−λβEt
∂V (si,Nt , pi
∗,N
t+1 , yˆ
∗,N
t+1 , gˆ
∗,N
t+1)
∂si,Nt
+ β
(
yˆi,Nt +
1
ϕ
gˆi,Nt
)
∂Et{pii,Nt+1}
∂si,Nt
+ pii,Nt +
1
ε
yˆi,Nt = −ψNg gˆi,Nt ,
(1.24)
with ψNg ≡ 1εϕ (λϕ+ (1 + λ)).
To develop some intuition, it is instructive to contrast optimality condition (1.24) with
the one derived under coordination, equation (1.22). For this purpose we abstract in a first
step from the dynamic terms on the left of equation (1.24). We observe that for a given
drop of output and inflation in the ELB scenario under consideration, the optimal policy
response entails a smaller increase of government spending than in case of coordination,
since ψNg > ψ
C
g . Intuitively, in the absence of coordination, a local policymaker anticipates
that higher government spending appreciates the terms of trade which, in turn, lowers
the demand for domestic goods. This effect is absent when government spending is raised
simultaneously in all countries under coordination. A non-cooperative policymaker will
therefore tend to opt for less fiscal stimulus. The following proposition establishes this
formally for the special case which eliminates the dynamic terms in equation (1.24).
Proposition 2. Given the effective-lower-bound scenario (see Section 1.2.2) and assuming
a symmetric equilibrium while β → 0, the optimal response of government spending w/o
coordination, measured in percentage deviations from the steady state w/o coordination,
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gˆ∗,NL , is given by:
gˆ∗,NL = −ΘNβ→0 rL > 0,
with
ΘNβ→0 ≡
(1− γN ) (κNε+ 1)
εψNg Γ
N
1 + (1− µ)γNλϕε+ γNΓN2
> 0,
where κN ≡ λ
(
1
1−γN + ϕ
)
, ΓN1 ≡ (1−µ)− (1−γN )µκN and ΓN2 ≡ (1−µ)−µλ and where
ΓN1 ,Γ
N
2 > 0 because of the assumption of a uniquely determined equilibrium. Furthermore,
it holds that
ΘNβ→0 < Θ
C
β→0,
where ΘC is stated in Proposition 1 above.
Proof. See Appendix 1.F. 
As in the case of coordination, the optimal response is constant for as long as the ELB
binds because in (the symmetric) equilibrium under consideration the terms of trade are
unaltered.
In the general case for β ∈ (0, 1), the optimal policy also reflects the fact that the terms
of trade operate as an endogenous state variable. The first term on the left of equation
(1.24) captures the effect that, all else equal, stronger terms of trade (that is, a lower st)
are expected to persist and to reduce expected future welfare when foreign demand and
foreign inflation are weak (as in the ELB scenario). To the extent that higher government
spending appreciates the terms of trade, there is thus an additional incentive to opt for less
spending in the absence of coordination. This effect reinforces the ordering established in
Proposition 2.
Turning to the second term on the left of equation (1.24), note that stronger terms of
trade (that is, a lower st) reduce inflation expectations, because, as they persist, they will
raise the purchasing power of workers and induce downward pressure on wages and inflation
(that is, ∂Et{pii,Nt+1}/∂si,Nt > 0). Via the Phillips curve, lower expected inflation reduces
inflation today. This dynamic terms-of-trade channel attenuates the appreciation of the
terms of trade in response to higher government spending (and output) and makes a fiscal
stimulus in the absence of cooperation relatively more attractive. Yet this dynamic channel
does not overturn the ordering established in Proposition 2 because it merely dampens the
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appreciation of the terms of trade.
Overall, we thus find that the terms of trade are crucial for optimal policy design, not
only in steady state, but also off steady state. Intuitively, without coordination there
is excessive government consumption in steady state, because better terms of trade are
beneficial in the long run, as the economy operates at full capacity. In the short-run,
local policymakers are keen to avoid the terms of trade appreciating too much with higher
spending, as it reduces the demand for domestic goods in times of economic slack.
1.4 Quantitative assessment
In this section we explore to which extent our result matters quantitatively as well as
the robustness of our results. In this regard we look at alternative parameter values, but
we also consider a version of the model with distortionary taxes. Lastly, we compute the
level of government spending with and without coordination and the welfare loss which
results from the lack of coordination at the ELB.
1.4.1 Baseline
In a first step we define a baseline scenario. For this purpose we assign parameter values
by targeting observations for the euro area and the US for the (pre-crisis) period 1999–2006.
We treat the US as a benchmark for a currency union in which government spending is set
cooperatively. For the euro area, in contrast, we assume that government expenditures are
set non-cooperatively.21
A period in the model corresponds to one quarter. We set χ = 0.148 in order to match
the average share of exhaustive government consumption relative to GDP in the US (see
Figure 1.1 above). To match the share of government consumption in the euro area which
is equal to 0.196, we set the openness parameter α to 0.2874, see equation (1.20).22 Further,
we set the time-discount factor β to 0.99 and θ = 0.925. Such a high degree of price
stickiness appears to be justified in light of the inflation dynamics observed in the context
of the crisis (Corsetti et al., 2013b). Moreover, as we illustrate by means of a sensitivity
21According to NIPA data 36.3% of exhaustive government expenditures in the US are determined at the
federal level. In the EU there is a common budget. However, it is very small and consists mostly of
transfers. There is basically no exhaustive government spending administrated at the area-wide level.
22The average import share in the euro area during 1999–2006 is closer to 50 percent, but this accounts also
for trade with countries outside of the euro area. The share of intra-euro area imports in GDP is about 17
percent according to the Monthly Foreign Trade Statistics of the OECD.
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Table 1.1: Parameter values
χ 0.148 Public consumption-GDP ratio
α 0.2874 Import-share in steady state
β 0.99 Discount factor
θ 0.925 Degree of price stickiness
ε 6 Elasticity of substitution
ϕ 2 Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply
φpi 1.5 Taylor coefficient
rL -0.0025 ELB scenario
µ 0.8 Expected duration of ELB
analysis below, understating the extent of price rigidity biases results in favor of fiscal policy
coordination. In this sense, a high degree of price rigidity is a conservative choice. We set
the elasticity of substitution among varieties to ε = 6. This implies an average markup of
20 percent. We assume ϕ = 2, which implies a Frisch elasticity of one half (Chetty et al.,
2011). We further assume for monetary policy that φpi = 1.5. In terms of the shock, we
assume that rL = −0.0025. This implies a natural rate of interest of −1% (annualized)
for the ELB scenario. As a baseline we assume µ = 0.8 which implies that the ELB is
expected to bind for 5 quarters. We explore below to what extent results vary with µ, but
also explore the robustness of our results with respect to changes in β, θ, ϕ and α. We also
verify that the ELB remains binding as government spending is raised in response to the
shock. Table 1 summarizes the parameter values.23
Given these parameter values, we solve the model in the absence of coordination
numerically as in Soderlind (1999).24 Appendix 1.G provides details. As we mention above,
in the absence of coordination policy choices may differ from an ex-ante perspective, but in a
symmetric Nash-equilibrium the economy inherits the Markov structure of the shock process
and is either in the shock state or in steady state. For the case of coordination, Proposition
1 provides the closed-form solution. Figure 1.2 displays the results. The horizontal axis
23Eggertsson and Singh (2016) study the accuracy of the loglinear approximate version of the New Keynesian
closed-economy model and find the approximate model works well even for a great depression scenario
where output falls by some 30 percent. We verify that for our parameter choice the economy’s departure
from steady state remains within this range, even as no fiscal stabilization takes place.
24Replication files are available under http://www.runmycode.org/companion/view/3105.
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Figure 1.2: Fiscal stimulus at the ELB when ELB ceases to bind in quarter 10, assuming
parameter values as given in Table 1.1. Coordination and discretion (solid line), no
coordination and discretion (dashed line) and coordination with commitment (dashed-
dotted line). Change of spending measured in percent of steady state spending w/ and w/o
coordination, respectively.
displays time in quarters. The vertical axis measures the increase of government spending
with and without coordination in percentage deviations from the respective steady state.
The underlying experiment assumes that while the expected duration of the ELB is 5
quarters, the ELB actually ceases to bind in quarter 10 only. For as long as it binds,
the optimal response under coordination is to increase government spending by about 3.5
percent of the steady-state level under coordination (solid line). Instead, in the absence
of coordination the optimal response is less aggressive: spending is increased by only 2.5
(dashed line). We conclude that whether there is coordination or not matters quantitatively.
As a benchmark, Figure 1.2 also shows the optimal response in case there is commitment
and coordination (dashed-dotted line). To compute the solution for this case we implement
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the algorithm put forward in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), see Appendix 1.H. The
response under commitment differs from the response under discretion in two ways. First,
for as long the ELB binds, government spending is constant under discretion (and above the
steady-state level), but increasing under commitment. Such “backloading”, as explained
in Werning (2012), is an effective way to stabilize the economy at the ELB because of
forward-looking price setting: as firms anticipate higher spending and hence higher inflation
in the future, they will, all else equal, raise prices already today. This is beneficial in a
deflationary environment.25
Second, after the ELB ceases to bind, government spending is at the steady-state level
under discretion, but reduced below steady state levels under commitment: a “spending
reversal”. Intuitively, this is beneficial, because after the ELB ceases to bind, a cut of
government spending lowers inflation and real interest rates (because monetary policy
satisfies the Taylor principle). Under commitment this lowers long-term real interest rates
while the ELB binds and thus contributes to stabilizing the economy during the ELB period
(Corsetti et al., 2010).
Turning back to the case of discretion, we compute a comprehensive measure of the
difference in fiscal stabilization at the ELB: the “stimulus gap”, that is, the difference
between the optimal spending response without coordination and with coordination, each
measured in percentage deviation from the respective steady state (gˆ∗,NL − gˆ∗,CL ). Figure 1.3
illustrates that the stimulus gap, measured along the vertical axis, increases strongly (in
absolute value) in the probability that the ELB binds for another period µ, measured along
the horizontal axis. Whether fiscal policies are coordinated or not hardly matters if the
expected duration of the ELB episode is short. However, for larger values of µ the stimulus
gap is sizable and reaches up to (minus) 4 percentage points.
1.4.2 Sensitivity analysis
We now explore how the stimulus gap varies with other important model parameters.
The panels in Figure 1.4 vary one parameter at a time when computing the stimulus
gap. We first consider alternative values for the discount factor β. It determines how the
dynamics of the terms of trade (as endogenous state variable) impact optimal policy in
25Werning (2012) studies a closed-economy model and so does Schmidt (2017) who finds that an activist
fiscal policymaker who cares less about the stabilization of public consumption than society may partly
correct for discretionary authorities’ inability to exploit the “expectations channel”.
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Figure 1.3: Fiscal stimulus gap at the ELB. Difference of optimal increase of government
consumption without and with coordination, measured in percentage points along the vertical
axis (gˆ∗,NL − gˆ∗,CL ), horizontal axis measures probability that the ELB remains binding for
another period (µ). We only consider parameter values for which the equilibrium is locally
unique.
the absence of coordination (see the discussion in Section 1.3.2 above).26 The upper-left
panel of Figure 1.4 shows the stimulus gap as a function of β. We find that the stimulus
gap increases (in absolute value) as β increases, because in the absence of coordination the
desire to avoid a persistent appreciation of the terms of trade increases with β.
The upper-right panel of Figure 1.4 shows the stimulus gap as a function of the degree
of price stickiness θ. We find that the lower the degree of price stickiness, the larger the
difference between the optimal policy under coordination and without. To understand
26At the same time β matters also for the slope of the Phillips curve. Yet, as we vary the value of β, we
keep κ constant (just like all other parameters) in order to focus on the role of the dynamic terms of trade
effect.
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Figure 1.4: Fiscal stimulus gap at the ELB, measured in percentage points along the vertical
axes (gˆ∗,NL − gˆ∗,CL ), as a function of model parameters, measured along the horizontal axis.
We only consider parameter values for which the equilibrium is locally unique. A diamond
indicates parameter values for the baseline.
this finding, note that inflation responds more strongly to higher government spending
if prices are more flexible. Higher inflation at the union level reduces real interest rates
and thus stimulates aggregate demand at the union level. At the country level, instead,
higher inflation appreciates the terms of trade and thus reduces the demand for domestically
produced goods. Hence, the more flexible prices, the more negative the stimulus gap.
The lower-left panel of Figure 1.4 shows the stimulus gap conditional on the inverse
of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ϕ. As the Frisch elasticity declines (that is, as ϕ
increases), marginal costs and, hence, inflation respond more strongly to higher government
spending. Put differently, the Phillips curve becomes steeper as ϕ increases, just like when
θ declines, see equation (1.10). We therefore find the stimulus gap more negative, the larger
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the Frisch elasticity.
The lower-right panel of Figure 1.4 shows the stimulus gap conditional on openness
parameter α. It is possible to show that, the higher the degree of openness, the stronger
the impact of government spending on the terms of trade. Consequently, in a more open
economy policymakers seek to avoid a stronger appreciation of the terms of trade in the
midst of a severe recession and provide a lower stimulus in the absence of policy coordination.
Note that the stimulus gap does not vanish in the closed economy limit (α = 0) since
monetary regimes still differ. While there is an implicit price-level target in place at the
country-level, the price level features a unit root at the union level. This difference has a
strong bearing on the transmission of fiscal policy (Corsetti et al., 2013a).
1.4.3 Distortionary taxes
Our baseline scenario assumes that taxes are lump-sum. We now investigate to what
extent our results hinge on this assumption. For this purpose, we continue to assume that
the government runs a balanced budget, but in order to do so, it adjusts labor income taxes
which are denoted by τ iN,t. We replace the government budget constraint (1.2) with the
following equation:
T i + τ iN,tW
i
tN
i
t = P
i
tG
i
t + τ
iW itN
i
t .
The lump-sum tax T i is still used to finance the employment subsidy (τ iW itN
i
t ) in order to
decentralize the social planner steady states. Linearizing the government budget constraint
gives the following equation after substituting for the real wage and labor:(
1
1− γ + (1 + ϕ)
)
yˆit +
1
1− τN τˆ
i
N,t =
1
1− γ gˆ
i
t,
where τN denotes the steady state labor income tax rate. Further, with distortionary taxes
the New Keynesian Phillips curve at the country level changes to:
piit = βEt{piit+1}+ λ
(
1
1− γ + ϕ
)
yˆit −
λγ
1− γ gˆ
i
t +
λτN
1− τN τˆ
i
N,t. (1.25)
A corresponding equation also holds at the union level.27
27The modifications of the rest of the model are moderate. A formal exposition is available upon request.
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Figure 1.5: Left panel shows stimulus gap at the ELB for lump sum taxes as in baseline
(solid line) and for distortionary taxes (dashed line). Right panel shows government spending
with coordination (solid line) and without (dashed line), measured in percent of respective
steady state. Horizontal axes measure the probability that the ELB remains binding for
another period (µ). We only consider parameter values for which the equilibrium is locally
unique.
Figure 1.5 shows the result: the left panel contrasts the stimulus gap for distortionary
taxes (dashed line) with the stimulus gap in the baseline case when taxes are lump-sum
(solid line). As before, the horizontal axis measures the probability that the ELB remains
binding for another period. It turns out that the stimulus gap is considerably larger (in
absolute value) when taxes are distortionary. To understand this finding, note that, all else
equal, raising taxes is inflationary, see equation (1.25). Higher taxes at the union-level can
therefore be expansionary at the ELB: because (expected) inflation is not met by a higher
interest rate, the real interest rate declines and the fiscal multiplier increases at the ELB,
as emphasized by Eggertsson (2011). At the country level, however, the inflationary effect
of higher distortionary taxes appreciates the terms of trade. Hence, the difference between
the optimal stimulus under coordination and without increases if taxes are distortionary.
The right panel of Figure 1.5 illustrates further the economic mechanism at play. It
displays the optimal response of government spending to the crisis, both for coordination
32
1.4. Quantitative assessment
and without, in percent of the respective steady state.28 Under coordination (solid line),
government spending is raised only mildly because of the inflationary effects of increasing
the income tax. In the absence of coordination (dashed line), however, government spending
is cut because this brings about a tax cut and thus weakens the terms of trade if taxes are
distortionary.
1.4.4 The level of government spending and welfare
So far we have focused on the percentage change of government spending at the ELB.
The stimulus gap, in particular, is computed as the percentage point difference of the
stimulus with and without coordination. As such it provides a measure for the difference
in the degree of fiscal stabilization and it turns out that the gap can be sizeable: it easily
amounts to 4 percentage points, as shown in Figure 1.3. Government spending, in other
words, is raised more aggressively under coordination. However, we have established in
Section 1.3.1 above that in steady state the level of government spending is lower under
coordination than without.
In what follows we therefore compare the optimal level of government spending at the
ELB. The left panel of Figure 1.6 shows the result. The vertical axis measures the optimal
level of government consumption with (solid line) and without (dashed line) coordination.
Along the horizontal axis we measure again the expected duration of the ELB episode. As
before, results are based on the parameter values listed in Table 1.1 above. We find that
the steady-state effect dominates: the level of spending without coordination exceeds the
optimal level with coordination for all values of µ for which there is a unique equilibrium.
Nevertheless, the distance between the optimal level of government expenditure with
and without coordination becomes smaller as the expected duration of the ELB episode
increases.29
Finally, we assess the welfare costs of a lack of coordination at the ELB. Specifically,
we compute the compensation in terms of consumption which is required to make the
household indifferent between the optimal stimulus under coordination and the stimulus
which is optimal in the absence of coordination. For this purpose we assume that the
28Compared to Figure 1.3 we plot the stimulus gap in Figure 1.5 for a smaller range of µ because the
inflationary effects of an increased income tax imply positive interest rates for high values of µ.
29For alternative parameter values the optimal level of spending without coordination actually falls short of
the optimal level with coordination. For instance, assuming ϕ = 0.2 and θ = 0.5 we find this to be the
case, provided the ELB episode is expected to be sufficiently long lasting.
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Figure 1.6: Left panel shows optimal level of government spending under coordination (solid
line) and without (dashed line): GCt and G
N
t . Right panel shows consumption equivalent
which compensates for the lack of coordination for as long as the ELB binds (percent of
steady state consumption with coordination, see Appendix 1.I). Horizontal axes measure
the probability that the ELB remains binding for another period (µ). We only consider
parameter values for which the equilibrium is locally unique.
economy is initially at the same steady state, namely the steady state which obtains under
coordination. We then compute the consumption equivalent by comparing the percentage
increase of government spending which is optimal under coordination with the percentage
increase which would have been optimal absent coordination. Importantly, we assume that
the household receives the compensation only for as long as the ELB binds (see Appendix
1.I for details).30
The right panel of Figure 1.6 displays the result. The vertical axis measures the
consumption equivalent in percent of steady-state consumption. The horizontal axis
measures the probability µ that the ELB remains binding for another period. As shown
above, the stimulus gap is negligible for low values of µ. For this reason the consumption
equivalent is also negligible in this parameter range. However, if the ELB is expected to
bind for a relatively long period, the benefits of coordination increase substantially. For
example, when the expected duration is 7 quarters (µ = 0.8571) the consumption equivalent
30Benigno and Benigno (2006) stress the importance of comparing optimal (monetary) policy with and
without coordination around the same steady state.
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amounts to about 0.69%.31 However, we stress once more that the consumption equivalent
is received only for as long the ELB binds, not permanently.
1.5 Conclusion
In the context of the global financial crisis fiscal policy has been rediscovered as a
stabilization tool. Central in this context is that monetary policy has become constrained
by the ELB on nominal interest rates. It not only seems natural to turn to fiscal policy for
additional support, it has also been established that fiscal policy is likely to be particularly
effective under these circumstances. Against this background, we consider a currency union
where a common monetary policy operates jointly with many fiscal policies. Assuming that
the common monetary policy is unable to stabilize area-wide inflation and output because
of the ELB constraint, we ask whether there is a need to coordinate government spending
policies across the member states of the union.
Our analysis is based on the model of Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008) which we extend in order
to account for the ELB and the absence of fiscal policy coordination. Absent coordination,
we find that policymakers use fiscal policy less aggressively than under coordination. The
resulting fiscal “stimulus gap” can be sizeable and the welfare gains from coordination
appear non trivial. Intuitively, what makes local policymakers reluctant to use fiscal policy
aggressively, is that unilateral fiscal stimulus appreciates the terms of trade and is therefore
less effective in stabilizing the local economy. However, if enacted across the entire union,
fiscal stimulus leaves the terms of trade of any single country unaffected and the union-wide
inflationary impulse stimulates economic activity at the ELB.
This result is specific to currency unions at the ELB. If the ELB does not bind, monetary
policy is perfectly able to stabilize union-wide output and inflation. Hence, in this sense
there is no need to coordinate fiscal policies. If the ELB binds, but exchange rates are
flexible, the terms of trade depreciate in response to a unilateral fiscal expansion. Hence, in
this case, the mechanism which drives our result changes fundamentally. And indeed, Cook
and Devereux (2011) consider a two-country model with flexible exchange rates and find
31In the right panel of Figure 1.6 we restrict the range of µ such that the equilibrium drop of output
and inflation remain empirically plausible. At the maximum value of µ considered in Figure 1.6, the
annualized drop of output and inflation is 16% and 2.6% in the absence of coordination. At this point, the
government spending multiplier at the union level amounts to 3.4. The multiplier and the welfare gains
from coordination increase strongly in µ; since we consider such a scenario as implausible we restrict the
range of µ accordingly.
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that the case for fiscal coordination is weak, even as the ELB binds. For these reasons, the
case of a currency union at the ELB is a special one. That said, it is certainly a relevant
one: our results are consistent with the view that the euro area did not receive sufficient
fiscal stimulus during the recent crisis. Still, a more comprehensive assessment would also
need to account for issues related to sovereign risk, an aspect from which we abstract in
our analysis. We leave this for future research.
1.A Steady state in the absence of coordination
1.A.1 Planner problem
The risk sharing condition and the market-clearing condition in (1.19) imply the following
equation:
Ci = (Y i −Gi)1−α(C∗)α. (1.A.1)
The Lagrangian associated with problem (1.19) is thus given by:
L =(1− χ) logCi + χ logGi −
(
N i
)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ Λ(Ci − (N i −Gi)1−α(C∗)α).
First order conditions are given by:
∂L
∂Ci
= (1− χ) 1
Ci
+ Λ = 0 (1.A.2)
∂L
∂N i
= −(N i)ϕ − Λ(1− α)(N i −Gi)−α(C∗)α
(1.A.1)
= −(N i)ϕ − Λ(1− α) C
i
Y i −Gi = 0 (1.A.3)
∂L
∂Gi
= χ
1
Gi
+ Λ(1− α)(N i −Gi)−α(C∗)α
= χ
1
Gi
+ Λ(1− α) C
i
Y i −Gi = 0. (1.A.4)
Combine (1.A.3) and (1.A.4) to get:
(N i)ϕ = χ
1
Gi
. (1.A.5)
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Further, combine (1.A.2) and (1.A.4):
χ
1− χ
Ci
Gi
= (1− α) C
i
Y i −Gi .
Which can be rearranged to:
Gi =
χ
1− χ
(
(1− α) + χ
1− χ
)−1
Y i. (1.A.6)
It thus follows for the absence of coordination that in each country i ∈ [0, 1] we have(
G
Y
)N
=
χ
(1− α)(1− χ) + χ. (1.A.7)
Since in a symmetric steady state Y i = N i, combining (1.A.5) and (1.A.7) gives for each
country:
NN = Y N = [(1− α)(1− χ) + χ] 11+ϕ . (1.A.8)
Further, it holds that GC < GN since
GC = χ <
χ
(1− α)(1− χ) + χ [(1− α)(1− χ) + χ]
1
1+ϕ = GN .
1.A.2 Decentralization of the planner solution in steady state
In the following we show how the planner allocation in the absence of coordination can
be decentralized in a symmetric zero-inflation steady state. Unless offset by the employment
subsidy, firms in country i choose a constant mark-up over marginal costs MCi, which can
be expressed as (see equation (41) in Gal´ı and Monacelli, 2008):
1− 1
ε
= MCi =
1− τ i
1− χ (N
i)1+ϕ
(
1− G
i
Y i
)
.
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In order to decentralize the planner solution government consumption, Gi, has to be set
according to (1.A.6). Solving the resulting expression for N i gives:
(N i)1+ϕ =
(
1− 1
ε
)
1− χ
1− τ i
(
1− χ
1− χ
(
(1− α) + χ
1− χ
)−1)−1
.
Further, in the absence of coordination the following subsidy has to be chosen in each
country i
1− τN =
(
1− 1
ε
)
(1− α)−1, (1.A.9)
such that the social planner solution without coordination is decentralized in a symmetric
zero-inflation steady state.
1.B Deriving the welfare function without coordination
In the absence of coordination there are linear terms in a second-order approximation to
household utility. We follow the approach of Benigno and Woodford (2006) and substitute
for the linear terms using a second order approximation to the market-clearing condition.
In the following we drop the country index i for simplicity and approximate the percentage
deviation of a generic variable Xt from its steady state X by
Xt −X
X
≈ xˆt + 1
2
xˆ2t ,
where xˆt = xt − x and xt = logXt.
1.B.1 Second order approximation to the goods market clearing condition
The market-clearing condition is given by Y it = C
i
t(S
i
t)
α+Git. Taking logs and rearranging
gives:
logCit = log(Y
i
t −Git)− α logSit .
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A second-order approximation to the above equation gives:
cˆit ≈
1
1− γ
(
yˆit − γgˆit
)− 1
2
γ
(1− γ)2 (gˆ
i
t − yˆit)2 − αsit. (1.B.1)
Combining the above equation with the risk-sharing condition (1.4) yields:
0 ≈ 1
1− γ
(
yˆit − γgˆit
)− 1
2
γ
(1− γ)2 (gˆ
i
t − yˆit)2 − sit + t.i.p. (1.B.2)
where (t.i.p.) captures terms independent of policy, namely cˆ∗t since it evolves exogenously
for a given member of the currency union. For future reference, we define:
Ay ≡ 1
1− γ ; Ag ≡ −
γ
1− γ ; As ≡ −1. (1.B.3)
1.B.2 Second order approximation to utility
Utility in country i, U it = U(C
i
t , G
i
t, N
i
t ), is additively separable in its arguments. A
second order approximation around a generic steady state Ci, Gi, N i therefore gives:
U it − U i ≈ U iCCi
(
Cit − Ci
Ci
)
+ U iGG
i
(
Git −Gi
Gi
)
+ U iNN
i
(
N it −N i
N i
)
+
1
2
U iCC(C
i)2
(
Cit − Ci
Ci
)2
+
1
2
U iGG(G
i)2
(
Git −Gi
Gi
)2
+
1
2
U iNN (N
i)2
(
N it −N i
N i
)2
.
Rewriting the expression in terms of log deviations the above approximation becomes:
U it − U i ≈ U iCCi
(
cˆit +
1
2
(cˆit)
2
)
+ U iGG
i
(
gˆit +
1
2
(gˆit)
2
)
+ U iNN
i
(
nˆit +
1
2
(nˆit)
2
)
+
1
2
U iCC(C
i)2(cˆit)
2 +
1
2
U iGG(G
i)2(gˆit)
2 +
1
2
U iNN (N
i)2(nˆit)
2.
Rearranging:
U it − U i ≈ U iCCi
(
cˆit +
1
2
(
1 +
U iCCC
i
U iC
)
(cˆit)
2
)
+ U iGG
i
(
gˆit +
1
2
(
1 +
U iGGG
i
U iG
)
(gˆit)
2
)
+U iNN
i
(
nˆit +
1
2
(
1 +
U iNNN
i
U iN
)
(nˆit)
2
)
.
39
1.B. Deriving the welfare function without coordination
Defining further: σ ≡ −UCCCUC , σg ≡ −
UGGG
UG
and σn ≡ UNNNUN yields
U it − U i ≈ U iCCi
(
cˆit +
1
2
(1− σ) (cˆit)2
)
+ U iGG
i
(
gˆit +
1
2
(1− σg) (gˆit)2
)
+U iNN
i
(
nˆit +
1
2
(1 + σn) (nˆ
i
t)
2
)
.
Since utility is given by
U it = (1− χ) logCit + χ logGit −
(N it )
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
,
the above defined parameters become: σ = σg = 1 while σn = ϕ, such that we get:
U it − U i
U iCC
i
≈ cˆit +
U iGG
i
U iCC
i
gˆit +
U iNN
i
U iCC
i
(
nˆit +
1
2
(1 + ϕ)(nˆit)
2
)
.
Because of monopolistic competition firms charge a markup over marginal costs. If not
offset by a certain value for the labor subsidy there will be a wedge Φ between the marginal
rate of substitution and the marginal product of labor (MPN) in steady state (see, for
instance, Gal´ı, 2008, p.106):
−U
i
N
U iC
= MPNi(1− Φ). (1.B.4)
In our setup we have MPN = Y/N . Therefore
U iN
U iC
N i
Ci
= − 1
1− γ (1− Φ),
with 1 − γ = C/Y . Making use of the above expression and the one for UGGUCC under the
assumed utility function, we can rewrite the approximation to utility as:
U it − U i
U iCC
i
≈ cˆit +
χ
1− χgˆ
i
t −
1− Φ
1− γ
(
nˆit +
1
2
(1 + ϕ)(nˆit)
2
)
.
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Further, we use equation (1.B.1) in order to substitute for cˆit. Therefore
U it − U i
U iCC
i
≈ 1
1− γ
(
yˆit − γgˆit
)− 1
2
γ
(1− γ)2 (gˆ
i
t − yˆit)2 − αsit
+
χ
1− χgˆ
i
t −
1− Φ
1− γ
(
nˆit +
1
2
(1 + ϕ)(nˆit)
2
)
+ t.i.p.
In order to substitute for nˆit, it can be shown that aggregate labor demand is given by
N it = Y
i
t
∫ 1
0
(
P it (j)
P it
)−ε
dj, see Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008). Define zit ≡ log
∫ 1
0
(
P it (j)
P it
)−ε
dj.
Thus, it holds around a symmetric steady state that:
nˆit = yˆ
i
t + z
i
t.
Further it can be shown that zit is of second order with z
i
t ≈ 12 ελ(piit)2, see again Gal´ı and
Monacelli (2008). Finally, the approximation to utility can be expressed as:
U it − U i
U iCC
i
≈ Φ
1− γ yˆ
i
t +
(
χ
1− χ −
γ
1− γ
)
gˆit − αsit
− 1
2
γ
(1− γ)2 (gˆ
i
t − yˆit)2 −
1
2
1− Φ
1− γ (1 + ϕ)(yˆ
i
t)
2 − 1
2
1− Φ
1− γ
ε
λ
(piit)
2 + t.i.p.
(1.B.5)
For future reference we define:
By ≡ Φ
1− γ ; Bg ≡
χ
1− χ −
γ
1− γ ; Bs ≡ −α. (1.B.6)
1.B.3 The welfare function—substituting for the linear terms
Absent coordination, government spending and the employment subsidy, τ , are not
chosen efficiently such that γ = γN 6= χ and Φ 6= 0. Specifically, in a symmetric steady
state the distortion Φ is given by (see Gal´ı, 2008, p.73 and p.106):
Φ = 1− 1ε
ε−1(1− τ)
.
Inserting for the subsidy according to (1.A.9) yields:
Φ = α.
41
1.C. Optimal policy with coordination
By inserting for γN and Φ in (1.B.3) and (1.B.6) we get:
Ay =
(1− χ)(1− α) + χ
(1− χ)(1− α) ; Ag = −
χ
(1− χ)(1− α) ; As = −1;
By =
α[(1− χ)(1− α) + χ]
(1− χ)(1− α) ; Bg = −
αχ
(1− χ)(1− α) ; Bs = −α.
Thus, it is easily seen that subtracting α times condition (1.B.2) from (1.B.5)—both
evaluated at the steady state in the absence of coordination—removes the linear terms from
the approximation to utility. As a result, the welfare function is given by:
WNt ≈ −
1
2
(
ε
λ
(piit)
2 + (1 + ϕ)(yˆit)
2 +
γN
1− γN
(
gˆit − yˆit
)2)
+ t.i.p.
1.C Optimal policy with coordination
The Lagrangian associated with problem (1.21) is given by
Lt = −1
2
(
ε
λ
(pi∗t )
2 + (1 + ϕ)(yˆ∗t )
2 +
γC
1− γC (gˆ
∗
t − yˆ∗t )2
)
+ ξ∗0,t
[
pi∗t − λ
(
1
1− γC + ϕ
)
yˆ∗t +
λγC
1− γC gˆ
∗
t − ν∗0,t
]
+ ξ∗1,t
[−(yˆ∗t − γC gˆ∗t ) + ν∗1,t] .
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions read as follows:
∂Lt
∂pi∗t
= − ε
λ
pi∗,Ct + ξ
∗
0,t = 0 (1.C.1)
∂Lt
∂yˆ∗t
= −(1 + ϕ)yˆ∗,Ct +
γC
1− γC (gˆ
∗,C
t − yˆ∗,Ct )− λ
(
1
1− γC + ϕ
)
ξ∗0,t − ξ∗1,t = 0
(1.C.2)
∂Lt
∂gˆ∗t
= − γ
C
1− γC (gˆ
∗,C
t − yˆ∗,Ct ) +
λγC
1− γC ξ
∗
0,t + γ
Cξ∗1,t = 0 (1.C.3)
ξ∗1,t(−(yˆ∗,Ct − γC gˆ∗,Ct ) + ν∗1,t) = 0
ξ∗1,t ≥ 0; −(yˆ∗,Ct − γC gˆ∗,Ct ) + ν∗1,t ≥ 0.
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Case 1 The effective-lower-bound constraint does not bind: ξ∗1,t = 0 and −(yˆ∗,Ct −
γC gˆ∗,Ct ) + ν∗1,t ≥ 0. Equation (1.C.3) thus implies for ξ∗0,t
ξ∗0,t =
1
λ
(gˆ∗,Ct − yˆ∗,Ct ). (1.C.4)
Inserting for ξ∗0,t in (1.C.2) yields
gˆ∗,Ct = 0.
Using this in (1.C.4) and combining it with (1.C.1) gives
yˆ∗,Ct = −εpi∗,Ct .
Therefore, when it is optimal to stabilize output at steady state inflation should be zero
and vice versa. And indeed, considering the functional form of the welfare function it is
clear that pi∗,Ct = yˆ
∗,C
t = gˆ
∗,C
t = 0 is the global maximum.
Case 2 The effective-lower-bound constraint binds: ξ∗1,t > 0 and−(yˆ∗,Ct −γC gˆ∗,Ct )+ν∗1,t = 0.
Rearrange (1.C.3):
−ξ∗1,t = −
1
1− γC (gˆ
∗,C
t − yˆ∗,Ct ) +
λ
1− γC ξ
∗
0,t.
Combining it with (1.C.2) yields after rearranging
ξ∗0,t = −
1
λ
yˆ∗,Ct −
1
λϕ
gˆ∗,Ct .
Inserting for ξ∗0,t in (1.C.1) gives
pi∗,Ct +
1
ε
yˆ∗,Ct = −ψCg gˆ∗,Ct , (1.C.5)
where ψCg ≡ 1εϕ .
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1.D Proof of proposition 1
In proposition 1 we state the solution for optimal government consumption at the ELB
with coordination. Under the ELB scenario under consideration, we get a two-state solution
(see Section 1.2.2). Optimal policy at the ELB is determined by equations (1.14), (1.16) and
(1.C.5) with ψt = 0. Further applying
κσ¯γ
σ¯+ϕ =
λγ
1−γ in (1.14) and (1.16), the three equations
read:
pi∗,CL =
1
(1− βµ)κ
C yˆ∗,CL −
1
(1− βµ)
λγC
(1− γC) gˆ
∗,C
L (1.D.1)
yˆ∗,CL =
(1− γC)(1− βµ)
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− (1− γC)µκC rL +
(1− µ)(1− βµ)γC − µλγC
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− (1− γC)µκC gˆ
∗,C
L
(1.D.2)
−ψCg gˆ∗,CL = pi∗,CL +
1
ε
yˆ∗,CL (1.D.3)
Equations (1.D.1) and (1.D.3) imply:
yˆ∗,CL =
ελγC
1−γC − (1− βµ)ψCg ε
κCε+ (1− βµ) gˆ
∗,C
L . (1.D.4)
Combining (1.D.2) with (1.D.4) and solving for gˆ∗,CL , we get:
gˆ∗,CL = −ΘCrL,
with
ΘC ≡ (1− γ
C)
(
κCε+ (1− βµ))
εψCg Γ
C
1 + (1− µ)γCλϕε+ γCΓC2
,
where ΓC1 ≡ (1 − µ)(1 − βµ) − (1 − γC)µκC and ΓC2 ≡ (1 − µ)(1 − βµ) − µλ. Since we
consider only uniquely determined equilibria (see the ELB scenario in Section 1.2.2), ΓC1
and ΓC2 are positive. All other expressions in Θ
C are non-negative. Hence, ΘC > 0. 
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1.E Optimal policy in the absence of coordination
The Lagrangian associated with problem (1.23) is given by
Lt =− 1
2
(
ε
λ
(piit)
2 + (1 + ϕ)(yˆit)
2 +
γN
1− γN
(
gˆit − yˆit
)2)
+ βEtV (s
i
t, pi
∗
t+1, yˆ
∗
t+1, gˆ
∗
t+1)
+m1,t
[
yˆit − yˆ∗t − γN gˆit + γN gˆ∗t − (1− γN )sit
]
+m2,t
[
piit − βEt{piit+1} − λ
(
1
1− γN + ϕ
)
yˆit + λ
γN
1− γN gˆ
i
t
]
+m3,t
[
piit − pi∗t + sit − sit−1
]
.
Note that while Et{piit+1} is taken as given, it is a given function of today’s state variable
sit. The first order conditions are given by:
∂Lt
∂piit
= − ε
λ
pii,Nt +m2,t +m3,t = 0 (1.E.1)
∂Lt
∂yˆit
= −(1 + ϕ)yˆi,Nt +
γN
1− γN (gˆ
i,N
t − yˆi,Nt ) +m1,t − λ
(
1
1− γN + ϕ
)
m2,t = 0
(1.E.2)
∂Lt
∂gˆit
= − γ
N
1− γN (gˆ
i,N
t − yˆi,Nt )− γNm1,t +
λγN
1− γNm2,t = 0 (1.E.3)
∂Lt
∂sit
= βEt
∂V (si,Nt , pi
∗,N
t+1 , yˆ
∗,N
t+1 , gˆ
∗,N
t+1)
∂si,Nt
− (1− γN )m1,t −m2,t
β∂Et{pii,Nt+1}
∂si,Nt
+m3,t = 0.
(1.E.4)
Solving first order conditions (1.E.2) and (1.E.3) for m2,t yields
m2,t = − 1
λ
yˆi,Nt −
1
λϕ
gˆi,Nt .
This implies for m3,t by (1.E.1)
m3t =
ε
λ
pii,Nt +
1
λ
yˆi,Nt +
1
λϕ
gˆi,Nt .
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First order condition (1.E.3) requires for m1,t that
m1,t = − 1
1− γN (gˆ
i,N
t − yˆi,Nt )−
1
1− γN yˆ
i,N
t −
1
1− γN
1
ϕ
gˆi,Nt .
Finally, substituting for the multipliers in (1.E.4) gives
− λβEt
∂V (si,Nt , pi
∗,N
t+1 , yˆ
∗,N
t+1 , gˆ
∗,N
t+1)
∂si,Nt
+ β
(
yˆi,Nt +
1
ϕ
gˆi,Nt
)
∂Et{pii,Nt+1}
∂si,Nt
+ pii,Nt +
1
ε
yˆi,Nt = −ψNg gˆi,Nt ,
with ψNg ≡ 1εϕ (λϕ+ (1 + λ)). Taking the limit of β → 0 the above condition becomes
pii,Nt +
1
ε
yˆi,Nt = −ψNg gˆi,Nt . (1.E.5)
1.F Proof of proposition 2
In proposition 2 we state the solution for optimal government consumption at the ELB in
the absence of coordination when β → 0 and compare it to the case of coordination. Under
the ELB scenario under consideration (see Section 1.2.2), we get a two-state solution in a
symmetric Nash equilibrium. Optimal policy at the ELB is determined by equations (1.14)
and (1.16) with β → 0 and (1.E.5). In a symmetric equilibrium the resulting system of
equations is isomorphic to the one obtained under coordination in Appendix 1.C. However,
the definitions of γN , κN and ψNg differ and now we let β → 0. The optimal policy is given
by:
gˆ∗,NL = −ΘNβ→0rL,
with
ΘNβ→0 ≡
(1− γN ) (κNε+ 1)
εψNg Γ
N
1 + (1− µ)γNλϕε+ γNΓN2
,
where ΓN1 ≡ (1−µ)− (1−γN )µκN and ΓN2 ≡ (1−µ)−µλ. Since we consider only uniquely
determined equilibria (see the ELB scenario in Section 1.2.2), ΓN1 and Γ
N
2 are positive. All
other expressions in ΘNβ→0 are non-negative. Hence, Θ
N
β→0 > 0.
Next we show that ΘNβ→0 < Θ
C
β→0 where Θ
C is as stated in Proposition 1. Since we
showed that all terms in ΘNβ→0 and Θ
C
β→0 are non-negative, we prove the above inequality
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by showing that the following holds:
ψCg εΓ
C
1,β→0 + (1− µ)γCλϕε+ γCΓC2,β→0
ψNg εΓ
N
1 + (1− µ)γNλϕε+ γNΓN2
< 1 <
(1− γC) (κCε+ 1)
(1− γN ) (κNε+ 1) , (1.F.1)
where ΓC1 and Γ
C
2 are as stated in Proposition 1.
The left hand side of equation (1.F.1) can be rearranged to:
0 <
1
ϕ
λ(1 + ϕ)ΓN1 + (γ
N − γC)(1− µ)(λϕε+ 1),
which holds true since γN > γC while the remaining terms are positive. Hence, we have
established that the left hand side is below unity.
We continue with the right hand side of (1.F.1) which can be rearranged to:
(γN − γC)(λϕε+ 1) > 0,
which holds true since γN > γC while the remaining parameters are positive. Hence, we
have established that the right hand side is above unity. 
1.G Numerical solution in the absence of coordination
In order to solve the model numerically we use the algorithm put forward by Soderlind
(1999). For this purpose we cast the equilibrium conditions in the following form:
Et
[
x1t+1
x2t+1
]
= A
[
x1t
x2t
]
+But. (1.G.1)
In the expression above x1t are state variables and x2t are control variables. For notational
convenience we define xt ≡ [x1t, x2t]′. The policy instrument is denoted by ut. We rearrange
the equilibrium condition at the country level—that is equations (1.7), (1.10) and (1.12) all
approximated around the steady state in the absence of coordination—in the following way
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in order to cast them into (1.G.1):
Et{piit+1} =
1
β
(
1 + κN (1− γN ))piit + γNβ
(
λ
1− γN − κ
N
)
gˆit −
1
β
κN yˆ∗t +
1
β
κNγN gˆ∗t
− 1
β
κN (1− γN )pi∗t −
1
β
κN (1− γN )sit−1,
sit =pi
∗
t − piit + sit−1.
The vectors in (1.G.1) are thus given by
x1t =

sit−1
pi∗t
yˆ∗t
gˆ∗t
 , x2t =
[
piit
]
, ut =
[
gˆit
]
,
while matrices A and B are given by
A =

1 1 0 0 −1
0 µ 0 0 0
0 0 µ 0 0
0 0 0 µ 0
− 1βκN (1− γN ) − 1βκN (1− γN ) − 1βκN 1βκNγN 1β
(
1 + κN (1− γN ))
 ,
B =

0
0
0
0
γN
β
(
λ
1−γN − κN
)

,
where we use that aggregate variables inherit the Markov structure of the shock in the crisis
scenario (see Section 1.2.2).
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Under discretion the policy problem is given in general terms by the following expression:
x′1tV x1t + vt = minut
[
x′tQxt + 2x
′
tUut + u
′
tRut + βEt{x′1t+1V x1t+1 + vt+1}
]
(1.G.2)
s.t. Etx2t+1 = CEtx1t+1, Eq. (1.G.1), and x1t given,
where x′1tV x1t is the value function (quadratic in the state variables), x′tQxt+2x′tUut+u′tRut
is the period loss function and x2t = Cx1t is a linear function that maps state variables
into control variables.
In order to cast the period loss function into this setup we rearrange it to:
ε
λ
(piit)
2 +
(
(1 + ϕ) +
γN
1− γN
)
(yˆit)
2 − 2 γ
N
1− γN yˆ
i
tgˆ
i
t +
γN
1− γN (gˆ
i
t)
2.
We further define the auxiliary matrix W by rewriting the above equation as follows:
[
piit yˆ
i
t gˆ
i
t
]
ε
λ 0 0
0 (1 + ϕ) + γ
N
1−γN − γ
N
1−γN
0 − γN
1−γN
γN
1−γN

pi
i
t
yˆit
gˆit
 = [piit yˆit gˆit]W
pi
i
t
yˆit
gˆit
 .
Further, we use the following version of the market clearing condition at the country level
yˆit = yˆ
∗
t + γ
N gˆit − γN gˆ∗t + (1− γN )(pi∗t − piit + sit−1)
to define the auxiliary matrix K:
pi
i
t
yˆit
gˆit
 =
 0 0 0 0 1 0(1− γN ) (1− γN ) 1 −γN −(1− γN ) γN
0 0 0 0 0 1


sit−1
pi∗t
yˆ∗t
gˆ∗t
piit
gˆit

= K
[
xt
ut
]
.
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Then, the period loss function can be cast into (1.G.2) as follows:
[
piit yˆ
i
t gˆ
i
t
]
ε
λ 0 0
0 (1 + ϕ) + γ
N
1−γN − γ
N
1−γN
0 − γN
1−γN
γN
1−γN

pi
i
t
yˆit
gˆit
 = [x′t u′t]K ′WK
[
xt
ut
]
.
By appropriate partitioning of K ′WK we obtain the matrices in (1.G.2):[
Q U
U ′ R
]
= K ′WK.
The solution to (1.G.2) gives the following policy rule (see Soderlind, 1999):
ut = −Fx1t.
Put differently
gˆit = −f1sit−1 − f2pi∗t − f3yˆ∗t − f4gˆ∗t .
In a symmetric equilibrium the terms of trade are zero and the equilibrium is determined
at the union level. The equilibrium conditions in the ELB scenario are:
gˆ∗,NL = −f2pi∗,NL − f3yˆ∗,NL − f4gˆ∗,NL
pi∗,NL =
1
1− βµκ
N (yˆ∗,NL −
σ¯γN
σ¯ + ϕ
gˆ∗,NL )
yˆ∗,NL =
(1− γN )(1− βµ)
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− (1− γN )µκN rL +
(1− µ)(1− βµ)γN − (1− γN )µκN γN σ¯σ¯+ϕ
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− (1− γN )µκN gˆ
∗,N
L .
Given the numerical solution for f2, f3 and f4 we solve the above system for gˆ
∗,N
L .
1.H Optimal policy with coordination and commitment
Under commitment we assume that the conduct of monetary policy is described by the
following version of the Taylor rule
i∗t = ψt (rt + φpipi
∗
t ) ,
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where ψt is a regime-switching parameter with
ψt =
0 if rt < 0,1 otherwise.
The Lagrangian is given by
Lt = −1
2
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
{(
ε
λ
(pi∗t )
2 + (1 + ϕ)(yˆ∗t )
2 +
γC
1− γC (gˆ
∗
t − yˆ∗t )2
)
+ η∗0,t
[
βEt{pi∗t+1}+ κC yˆ∗t −
λγC
1− γC gˆ
∗
t − pi∗t
]
+ η∗1,t
[
Et{yˆ∗t+1} − yˆ∗t − (1− γC)(ψt(rt + φpipi∗t )− Et{pi∗t+1} − rt)
− γCEt{gˆ∗t+1}+ γC gˆ∗t
]}
.
Assuming policymaking under a timeless perspective, the first order conditions read as
follows:
∂Lt
∂pi∗t
= − ε
λ
pi∗,Ct − η∗0,t + η∗0,t−1 − (1− γC)φpiψtη∗1,t + β−1(1− γC)η∗1,t−1 = 0 (1.H.1)
∂Lt
∂yˆ∗t
= −(1 + ϕ)yˆ∗,Ct +
γC
1− γC (gˆ
∗,C
t − yˆ∗,Ct ) + κCη∗0,t + β−1η∗1,t−1 − η∗1,t = 0 (1.H.2)
∂Lt
∂gˆ∗t
= − γ
C
1− γC (gˆ
∗,C
t − yˆ∗,Ct )−
λγC
1− γC η
∗
0,t − β−1γCη∗1,t−1 + γCη∗1,t = 0 (1.H.3)
The equilibrium conditions under coordination with commitment are thus given by equations
(1.8), (1.11), (1.H.1), (1.H.2) and (1.H.3). We solve for the equilibrium as described in
Appendix A in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). They compute optimal monetary policy
in a similar ELB scenario. In order to solve for optimal policy under commitment they
assume that there is a certain date S at which the shock to rt disappears with probability
one. Given the solution for this particular case, one can then compute the solution for any
period t < S in which the shock disappears unexpectedly. To mimic our ELB scenario
in Section 1.2.2, we assume that period S is sufficiently far in the future. Furthermore,
compared to their analysis, the Taylor rule in our setup implies that there is no state in
which the ELB is still binding even though the shock disappeared.
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1.I Consumption equivalent
We compute the consumption equivalent ζ as the compensation in terms of consumption
which is required to make the household indifferent between the optimal stimulus under
coordination and the stimulus which is optimal in the absence of coordination. Importantly,
we compare the fiscal stimuli with and without coordination around the same steady
state—namely the one with coordination. We use superscript N˜ to index the equilibrium
outcome which obtains if the percentage increase of government spending at the efficient
steady state is equal to what is optimal in the absence of coordination. We use ζ to denote
the percentage increase of consumption that makes the household in this equilibrium as
well off as in the equilibrium with the stimulus under coordination (as given in proposition
1). Formally, the consumption equivalent is defined by
UCL = U
N˜
L (ζ), (1.I.1)
where
UCL = (1− χ) logCCL + χ logGCL −
(
NCL
)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
,
U N˜L (ζ) ≡ (1− χ) log(CN˜L (1 + ζ)) + χ logGN˜L −
(
N N˜L
)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
= U N˜L (0) + (1− χ) log(1 + ζ).
Here, we assume that the household receives the compensation only for as long as the ELB
binds. Inserting in (1.I.1) and rearranging yields:
(1− χ) log(1 + ζ) = UCL − U N˜L (0).
We use the second order approximation to period utility provided by Gal´ı and Monacelli
(2008) to approximate UCL and U
N˜
L (0) around the steady state under coordination. After
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rearranging we get:
ζ ≈ exp
{
− 1
2
1
1− χ
(
ε
λ
(pi∗,CL )
2 + (1 + ϕ)(yˆ∗,CL )
2 +
γC
1− γC (gˆ
∗,C
L − yˆ∗,CL )2
)
+
1
2
1
1− χ
(
ε
λ
(pi∗,N˜L )
2 + (1 + ϕ)(yˆ∗,N˜L )
2 +
γC
1− γC (gˆ
∗,N˜
L − yˆ∗,N˜L )2
)}
− 1.
(1.I.2)
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Chapter 2
Exchange Rate Undershooting: Evidence and
Theory
Joint with Gernot Mu¨ller and Martin Wolf
2.1 Introduction
Some 40 years ago, Dornbusch (1976) put forward a seminal account of how exchange
rates adjust to monetary policy shocks. It goes as follows. In the long run the exchange
rate appreciates in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock. This ensures that
purchasing power parity will be restored since the shock induces a permanent decline of
the price level. In the short run, as domestic interest rates exceed foreign rates, market
participants expect the exchange rate to depreciate. This ensures that uncovered interest
parity will be satisfied. How can expectations of an appreciation in the long run be consistent
with expectations of a depreciation in the short-run? The exchange rate has to overshoot
its new long run level on impact.
Expectations take center stage in Dornbusch’s account and, importantly, adjust in-
stantaneously to the shock. Yet by now there is pervasive evidence that expectations
adjust only sluggishly to new information (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2012, 2015). More
specifically, recent work by Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a) illustrates the importance of
information frictions for the transmission of monetary policy.1 Since market participants
have incomplete information about the state of the economy, monetary policy innovations
carry potentially new information about the natural rate of interest.
This matters for exchange rate dynamics because natural rate shocks that signal rising
potential output will generally depreciate the exchange rate. Due to information frictions
1Romer and Romer (2000) established the notion that there are informational asymmetries between the
Federal Reserve and the private forecasters. They also show that private forecasters adjust forecasts in
response to monetary policy actions. Melosi (2017) estimates a model with dispersed information. In his
model monetary policy shocks have a “signaling effect” to the extent that heterogenous price setters seek
to learn about the state of the economy.
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market participants only learn over time the true nature of the shock. As a result, the
initial response of the nominal exchange rate to a genuine monetary policy shock may
therefore be muted. The exchange rate, in other words, undershoots rather than overshoots
its new long-run value in the presence of information frictions. In the first part of this paper
we provide evidence that the exchange rate indeed undershoots in response to monetary
policy shocks. In the second part of the paper we put forward an open economy model
with information frictions. It is able to account for the evidence, both qualitatively and
quantitatively.
In the first part of the paper, we rely on local projections to estimate the response of
the exchange rate and of other variables of interest to monetary policy shocks (Jorda`, 2005).
For this purpose we use the series of monetary policy shocks identified by Romer and Romer
(2004) and updated by Coibion et al. (2017). Importantly, this series represents genuine
monetary policy shocks, that is, innovations to the federal funds rate which are purged of
not only of endogenous, but also of anticipatory components. In addition, local projections
offer a convenient way to capture the permanent effect of monetary policy shocks on the
exchange rate.
The sample for our baseline specification runs from the post-Bretton Woods period to
2008 and we obtain estimates based, in turn, on quarterly and monthly data. Our main
variable of interest is the effective exchange rate of the US dollar, but we also estimate
the effect of US monetary policy shocks on US output and prices. The key result of our
empirical analysis is that the exchange rate undershoots its new long-run level. In response
to an exogenous interest rate increase by 100 basis points, the exchange rate appreciates by
about 1 percent on impact. Over time there is further appreciation with a maximum effect
of about 5 percent after about 2-3 years.
We seek to rationalize the evidence in the second part of the paper as we develop a New
Keynesian model in which agents form expectations rationally, but subject to an information
friction. In particular, whereas the central bank has full knowledge of the natural rate,
private agents observe the natural rate imperfectly, as in Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a).
Market participants therefore face an inference problem whenever they observe a surprise
increase of the interest rate. It may reflect a genuine monetary policy shock, a policy
response to a natural rate shock, or, as in Nakamura and Steinsson’s formulation, a mixture
of both. As a consequence, interest rate surprises induce an “information effect” that
generates an adjustment that differs from what obtains in full-information models.
Our model differs from the model of Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a) in two respects.
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First, we consider a small open economy rather than a closed economy model. Second,
our model features both a genuine monetary policy shock and a natural rate shock. As a
result, we have to make the inference problem of market participants explicit. At the same
time, this allows us to study the effect of monetary policy shocks and natural rate shocks
in isolation—both under perfect and imperfect information. Under perfect information, a
monetary policy shock generates nominal appreciation and exchange rate overshooting, just
like in Dornbusch (1976). Following a natural rate shock, on the other hand, the exchange
rate depreciates and more so in the long run than in the short run because the natural rate
shock signals a rising level of potential output.
The key finding of our model analysis is that a monetary policy shock may induce
exchange rate undershooting in the presence of information frictions. Intuitively, market
participants account for the possibility that the policy rate increase is due to an increase of
the natural rate, in which case the exchange rate would depreciate in the long run. As a
forward looking variable, the immediate response of the exchange rate reflects this possibility
as well as the possibility that the increase of the policy rate represents a genuine shock. Its
response is therefore dampened in the short run, both relative to a full-information scenario
and relative to the long-run response. It is only over time that agents learn the true nature
of the shock and the exchange rate continues to appreciate.
We also perform a quantitative analysis and estimate key parameters of the model by
matching the empirical impulse response functions for the federal funds rate, output, the
price level and the nominal exchange rate. Specifically, we employ an indirect inference
approach using the estimated impulse response functions as an “identified moment” that
conveys actual information about structural features of the economy (Nakamura and
Steinsson, 2018b). We use this procedure for it is quite robust to misspecification in both
the empirical model that is used to generate the identified moment (Gourieroux et al., 1993;
Smith, 2008), as well as in the theoretical model that is used to explain the identified moment
(Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018b). As explained in Smith (2008), under some conditions,
the estimated parameters are the same as those obtained by maximum likelihood.
We find that the estimated model predicts a path for the exchange rate in response to a
monetary policy shock which aligns closely with the empirical impulse response function for
this variable. The estimated parameters also appear plausible. In particular, they imply
that market participants attribute about 2/3 of the innovations of the policy rate to natural
rate disturbances, and only 1/3 to genuine monetary policy shocks. This value is almost
identical to the estimate reported by Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a) on the basis of
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an altogether different approach. Also, the extent of information friction implied by our
estimates squares well with the results of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012).
In an influential study, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) estimated the effects of monetary
policy shocks within a vector autoregression (VAR) model and documented a pattern that
has become known as “delayed overshooting”: in response to a contractionary monetary
shock the exchange rate appreciates on impact and depreciates thereafter. However, the
depreciation sets in only after a delay of more than two years. During the interim period,
the exchange rate continues to appreciate. This pattern has been found to be robust
across a number of alternative specifications and identification schemes. It has also been
documented for the real exchange rate (see, for instance, Scholl and Uhlig, 2008; Steinsson,
2008; Bouakez and Normandin, 2010; Bruno and Shin, 2015).2 In a recent contribution, Kim
et al. (2017), have performed a sub-sample analysis and found that delayed overshooting
obtains only during the 1980s.
We also find for some specifications of our empirical model a reversal of exchange
rate dynamics after the maximum effect—in line with delayed overshooting. However,
regarding this reversal, we find a) that it occurs very late (after about 4 years) and b) that
it is rather modest. Also, in a recent paper, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2018) distinguish
between temporary and permanent shocks as they identify the effect of monetary policy
on the exchange rate in an estimated state-space model. They find no overshooting for
either temporary nor permanent shocks—neither immediate, nor delayed. Against this
background, we consider “undershooting” rather than “delayed overshooting” the core issue
on which we focus in our analysis.
Still, we acknowledge related work that has rationalized delayed overshooting on theoret-
ical grounds. In Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2010) delayed overshooting arises because of
infrequent portfolio adjustments. Kim et al. (2017) argue that delayed overshooting arises
in the 1980s because the Volker disinflation was lacking credibility. This is consistent with
the model put forward by Gourinchas and Tornell (2004) in which investors systematically
underestimate the persistence of interest rate innovations. Importantly, in our model we
rely on a different kind of information friction. We assume that private agents cannot
distinguish monetary shocks from natural rate surprises. And while we show that our
estimated model accounts for undershooting, we stress that it is also able to generate either
2However, the “delayed overshooting puzzle” has not gone unchallenged and some studies have indeed
reported overshooting (Kim and Roubini, 2000; Faust and Rogers, 2003; Bjornland, 2009; Forni and
Gambetti, 2010).
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immediate overshooting or delayed overshooting for alternative parameterizations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe our
empirical analysis and present results. Section 2.3 outlines the small open economy model
with information rigidities. It also explains our estimation procedure and discusses results.
Section 2.4 inspects the mechanism, notably by contrasting the transmission mechanism in
the model to the one in which market participants have full information. In Section 2.5
we consider additional evidence which has not been used in the estimation to assess the
external validity of our results. A final section concludes.
2.2 Evidence
In this section we provide evidence on how the nominal exchange rate adjusts to monetary
policy shocks. We focus on the US and estimate the response of the effective exchange rate
of the US dollar to a shock in the federal funds rate. We use series of monetary policy
shocks provided by Coibion et al. (2017) who, in turn, extend and update the original shock
series identified by Romer and Romer (2004). We use the narrow nominal effective exchange
rate index compiled the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) which is a trade-weighted
index of bilateral exchange rates of the US to 14 economies and the euro area.
The approach to identify the shocks is detailed in Romer and Romer (2004). Here we
summarize the main idea. In a first step, Romer and Romer construct series for the Fed’s
intended federal funds rate before FOMC meetings on the basis of narrative sources. In
a second step Romer and Romer purge the changes of the intended federal funds rate at
FOMC meetings from changes that are due to information the Fed has about the future
economic development. For this purpose they regress the change of the intended federal
funds rate on the Fed’s Greenbook forecasts for inflation, real output growth, and the
unemployment rate. Since there is no evidence that monetary policymakers use a substantial
amount of information on economic activity in addition to the Greenbook forecasts as they
set the rate, the regression residuals may be interpreted as genuine monetary policy shocks.
We use local projections to directly estimate the impulse responses to monetary policy
shocks (Jorda`, 2005). For our baseline specification, we estimate the responses of the
nominal exchange rate and of key macroeconomic variables using quarterly data for the
period 1976Q1 until 2007Q3, that is, our sample starts after the Bretton Woods System
had been completely abandoned (see also Kim et al., 2017). Our sample stops before the
financial crisis. In our robustness analysis we consider alternative sample periods as well.
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Our empirical specification builds on Coibion et al. (2017). Formally, letting eRRt denote
a US monetary policy shock in period t and xt the realization of a variable of interest, we
estimate the following model:
xt+h − xt−1 = c(h) +
J∑
j=1
α
(h)
j (xt−j − xt−j−1) +
K−1∑
k=0
β
(h)
k e
RR
t−k + εt+h. (2.1)
In this specification, we estimate the effect on the variable of interest at horizon h relative
to to the pre-shock level (Stock and Watson, 2018). In this way, we account for permanent
effects of monetary policy shocks on the variables of interest. Our specification includes
J lags of the dependent variable and K lags of the shock. c(h) is a constant for horizon
h and εt+h is an error term with mean zero and strictly positive variance. We compute
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard-errors as in Newey and West
(1987).
We estimate the empirical model above for the log of US real GDP, the log of the CPI,
as well as for the log of the nominal effective exchange rate of the US dollar. We also
estimate the response of the federal funds rate to the shock in levels.3 We follow Coibion
et al. (2017) and restrict the contemporaneous effect of monetary policy shocks on GDP
and the CPI to be equal to zero.4 For all regressions we consider one year of lags of the
shock and the endogenous variable, that is, we set J = 4 and K = 4. Our results are robust
across alternative specifications, as we show below.
Figure 2.1 shows the impulse responses to a monetary policy shock which is normalized so
that the federal funds rate increases by 100 basis points initially. Here the solid lines represent
the point estimate, while shaded areas indicate 68 percent and 90 percent confidence bands.
The horizontal axis measures time in quarters. The vertical axis measures the impulse
response in percentage points (fed funds rate) or the deviation from the pre-shock level
in percent (the other variables). The upper-left panel shows that the federal funds rate
rises persistently for about 1.5 years. Afterwards it gradually converges back to zero. The
upper right panel shows the response of output which displays a distinct hump-shaped
pattern, familiar from earlier work on the monetary transmission mechanism. We observe a
maximum effect after about one year, when output has declined by approximately 1 percent.
The effect on output ceases to be significant after 2-3 years. The lower-left panel shows
3In this case we exclude the pre-shock level and do not consider differenced lags. All series except for the
exchange rate (BIS) are obtained from the St. Louis Fed (FRED).
4In this case, the second sum in equation (2.1) runs from k = 1 to K.
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Figure 2.1: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock. Solid line corresponds to point
estimate. Shaded areas correspond to 68% and 90% confidence intervals, respectively. Time
(horizontal axis) is in quarters. Vertical axis measures deviation from pre-shock level in
percent, except for the federal funds rate (percentage points, annualized). Sample: 1976Q1
to 2007Q3.
the response of the price level. Initially, prices adjust sluggishly. We observe a significant
decline of prices only after about 1.5 to 2 years, again a familiar finding of earlier studies.
However, the price level continues to decline markedly afterwards. Five years after the
shock it is reduced by some 3 percent.
Finally, we turn to response of the nominal exchange rate, shown in the lower-right
panel. Here, the exchange rate measures the price of foreign currency in terms of US dollars.
Hence, a decline of the exchange rate represents an appreciation of the dollar. We observe a
significant impact response. The dollar appreciates immediately by approximately 1 percent
in response to the shock. The appreciation, however, continues over time. Only after about
two years does exchange rate settle on a new level. At this point is has gained some 5
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Figure 2.2: Impulse response of the nominal exchange rate for alternative model specifica-
tions. J and K refer to number of lags of the dependent variable and the shock included in
local projection (2.1), respectively. Solid line corresponds to point estimate. Shaded areas
correspond to 68% and 90% confidence intervals, respectively. Time (horizontal axis) is
in quarters. Vertical axis measures deviation from pre-shock level in percent (annualized).
Sample: 1976Q1 to 2007Q3.
percent in value. Relative to this long-run effect, the impact response is muted. We find, in
other words, that the exchange rate undershoots its new long-run level on impact.
In Figure 2.2, we further explore the long-run response of the nominal exchange rate. For
this purpose we estimate impulse responses for a horizon of 10 years (h = 40). In addition,
we consider different specifications for the number of lags of the shock and the nominal
exchange rate in the empirical model (2.1). In the upper-left panel we only include the
contemporaneous shock. The upper-right panel is our baseline scenario but now estimated
for an horizon for up to 10 years. The lower panels increase the number of lags of both the
monetary policy shock and the nominal exchange rate to 8 and 12, respectively.
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Across specifications the exchange rate dynamics display some notable patterns. First, in
response to a monetary contraction the dollar appreciates permanently. Second, the initial
response is weaker than the long-run response. In this sense, there is always undershooting.
Third, there is some reversal of the maximum appreciation down the road. In principle, this
finding is consistent with “delayed overshooting”, the focus of much of the earlier literature
following Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). However, in what follows we focus on the fact that
the exchange rate undershoots initially because the reversal of the exchange rate occurs
very late and is fairly modest. Also, at no point is this reversal complete.5
Next, we estimate model (2.1) on monthly data. In line with the baseline specification,
we now include 12 lags of the shock and the dependent variable (J = 12 and K = 12). In
this context we also estimate the response of the narrow real effective exchange rate (also
taken from the BIS). Further, we consider alternative horizons in our estimation. Figure
2.3 shows the results. The horizontal axis now measures time in months. The upper panels
show the impulse response of the nominal and the real exchange rate for the short run, that
is, during the first year after the shock (h = 12). Both, the nominal and real exchange rate
appreciate significantly at the 90% level on impact by about 0.5 percent and continue to
appreciate during the entire year. The value of the dollar increase by some 4 percent, both
nominally and in real terms at the end of the first year.
The lower panels of Figure 2.3 show the response of the nominal and the real exchange
rate for a horizon of 5 years. The nominal exchange rate continues to appreciate with a
maximum effect of about 8 percent after some 4 years. Hence, we find that undershooting
is a robust feature of the data. It obtains for monthly data as well. The impulse response
of the real exchange rate resembles the one of the nominal exchange rate, a familiar finding
from earlier VAR studies (for instance, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995).
Finally, we consider alternative sample periods. The Romer-Romer shock series compiled
by Coibion et al. (2017) ends in 2008. For the more recent period we rely on monetary
policy shocks as identified by Jarocin´ski and Karadi (2018). Jarocin´ski and Karadi (2018)
rely on high-frequency data around policy announcement to measure interest rate surprises.
A key contribution of their paper is to disentangle genuine monetary policy shocks and
complementary central bank information that may also raise interest rates. In order to do
5Note that model (2.1) accounts for permanent effects of monetary policy shocks on the exchange rate.
Earlier VAR based studies instead include the exchange rate in levels. Yet conventional VAR models
deliver inconsistent estimates of impulse response functions at longer horizons in the presence of unit roots
(Phillips, 1998).
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Figure 2.3: Impulse response of the exchange rate to a monetary policy shock: nominal (left)
and real (right). Time (horizontal axis) is measured in months. Solid line corresponds to
point estimate. Shaded areas correspond to 68% and 90% confidence intervals, respectively.
Time (horizontal axis) is in months. Vertical axis measures deviation from pre-shock level
in percent annualized). Sample: 1976M1 to 2007M7.
so they restrict the sign of the response of stock prices. These shocks are available for the
period between February 1990 and December 2016.
In Figure 2.4 we vary the sample periods on which we estimate our empirical model
(2.1). The upper panels first show the results for different samples using the Romer-Romer
shocks. In the upper-left panel we consider a longer sample. It starts in 1973 when the
Bretton-Woods system broke down and runs until the end of 2008. The results do not
change much for this specification relative to the baseline. In the upper-right panel we
consider only the post-Volcker period and exclude the financial crisis (1988-01 to 2007-07).
For this short sample, we find undershooting as well (although the exchange rate depreciates
on impact). This is in contrast to Kim et al. (2017), who find overshooting for this period.
64
2.2. Evidence
0 12 24 36 48 60
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
Pe
rc
en
t
0 12 24 36 48 60
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
Pe
rc
en
t
0 12 24 36 48 60
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
Pe
rc
en
t
0 12 24 36 48 60
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
Pe
rc
en
t
Figure 2.4: Impulse response of the nominal exchange rate to two kinds of monetary policy
shocks: Upper panels use Romer, Romer (RR) shocks. Lower panels use Jarocin´ski, Karadi
(JK) shocks. Shaded areas correspond to 68% and 90% confidence intervals, respectively.
Time (horizontal axis) is in months.
In the lower panels of Figure 2.4, we show results for the Jarocin´ski-Karadi shock series.
The lower-left panel shows the impulse response of the nominal exchange rate for the whole
sample.6 The lower-right panel shows results for a shorter sample. It, too, captures the
post-Volcker period and runs up until the beginning of the financial crisis. Overall, we find
that the pattern of the exchange rate response to the US monetary policy shocks identified
by Jarocin´ski and Karadi (2018) is fairly similar to that obtained for the Romer-Romer
shocks, even as the sample period differs.
6We normalize the impulse response such that the impact equals the one for the Romer-Romer shocks.
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2.3 Theory
In this section we put forward our model, which builds on and extends the model by
Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a). We estimate the model on the basis of an indirect inference
approach. Finally, we use the estimated model to quantify the extent of information frictions
that is required to account for the evidence established in Section 2.2.
2.3.1 Model
We consider a New Keynesian small open economy model a` la Gal´ı and Monacelli
(2005a). The distinct feature of our model are information frictions. The private sector
observes only a noisy signal of potential output and therefore of the natural rate of interest.
The central bank, in contrast, observes the natural rate perfectly. Market participants
understand the central bank’s reaction function. As a result, the central bank conveys new
information about the natural rate to the private sector whenever it adjusts the policy rate.
However, agents update their beliefs about the natural rate only imperfectly, as adjustments
in the policy rate may also represent monetary policy shocks.
We connect with two recent advances in the literature on expectations formation and
its links with monetary policy. First, we build a model with noisy information. Coibion and
Gorodnichenko (2012, 2015) show that information frictions, or more specifically models
with noisy information, account well for key features of the data on expectations formation.
Second, we build on Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a) who show that a monetary surprise
reflects not necessarily a monetary policy shock, but also carries information about the
natural rate. We extend the analysis of Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a) in that we i)
consider an open economy model, ii) model the process underlying movements in the natural
rate explicitly and iii) make the inference problem of agents explicit—that is, we study the
case of full rational expectations.7
The environment underlying our model is standard except for the information friction.
The domestic country is small such that domestic developments have no bearing on the
rest of the world. In the domestic economy, monopolistically competitive firms produce
a variety of goods which are consumed domestically as well as exported. The law of one
7There is an important distinction between expectations not being rational, and expectations being rational
but based on incomplete information. Our model belongs to the latter category. The former category
includes models where agents form expectations by learning using subjective beliefs (e.g., Adam et al.,
2012), or models where agents use adaptive expectations, among many others.
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price holds at the level of varieties. Prices are set in the currency of the producer and
adjusted infrequently due to a Calvo constraint. Goods markets are imperfectly integrated
as domestically produced goods account for a non-zero fraction of the final consumption
good. Put differently, the share of domestic goods in home consumption is disproportional
to the size of the domestic economy. The real exchange rate may deviate from purchasing
power parity as a result. International financial markets are complete so that there is
perfect consumption risk sharing between the rest of the world and the domestic country.
In the appendix, we specify the problems of households and firms in detail. In what
follows we provide, in turn, a compact exposition of the approximate equilibrium conditions
and an explanation of how expectations are formed in the presence of noisy information.
2.3.1.1 Approximate equilibrium conditions
We approximate dynamics in the neighborhood of the steady state. The structural
parameters and initial conditions in the domestic economy are the same as in the rest of
the world. The steady state is therefore symmetric. There is no inflation in steady state
and international relative prices are unity. In what follows, we express all variables in logs.
Foreign variables are denoted with a star. They are time-invariant because they are not
affected by developments that occur in the (small) domestic economy.
Inflation dynamics are determined by the New Keynesian Phillips curve:
pit = βE˜tpit+1 + κ(yt − ynt ) + ηt, (2.1)
where pit is inflation of domestically produced goods, yt is output, y
n
t is potential output,
and ηt ∼ N (0, σ2η) is an exogenous disturbance. In turn, 0 < β < 1 is the time-discount
factor and κ > 0 captures the extent of nominal rigidities.
The fact that expectations are not based on the full but rather on an incomplete
information set is indicated by a tilde above the expectations operator, E˜t. The way in
which E˜t is formed and its properties are detailed below.
We assume that potential output follows a first-order autoregressive process in first
differences
∆ynt = ρy∆y
n
t−1 + ε
y
t , ε
y
t ∼ N (0, σ2y),
where 0 ≤ ρy < 1, such that a positive disturbance εyt > 0 sets in motion a gradual increase
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of ynt to a permanently higher level. This will capture that an increase of the natural
rate signals to private agents a growing economy, in line with the evidence put forward by
Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a).
A second equilibrium condition links output and the real exchange rate
θyt = et + p
∗ − pt, (2.2)
where θ−1 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Here, et denotes the nominal
exchange rate, the price of foreign currency expressed in terms of domestic currency, pt is
the price index of domestically produced goods (such that pit = pt − pt−1) and p∗ is the
foreign price level. The composite term et + p
∗− pt determines the country’s terms of trade,
which move proportionately with the real exchange rate in our model. An increase in et
therefore indicates a nominal depreciation of the domestic currency, whereas an increase
in et + p
∗ − pt indicates a real depreciation. In order to obtain equation (2.2) we combine
market clearing for domestically produced goods with the risk-sharing condition implied by
complete international financial markets (Backus and Smith, 1993). Equation (2.2) shows
that following a real depreciation the demand for domestically produced goods increases.
The nominal exchange rate, in turn, is determined via the uncovered interest rate parity
condition
E˜t∆et+1 = it − i∗. (2.3)
Here, it is the domestic short-term nominal interest rate, and i
∗ is the foreign rate. According
to this condition, the exchange rate is expected to depreciate whenever domestic interest
rates exceed foreign rates.
Finally, the model is closed by specifying monetary policy. We posit the following
Taylor-type rule
it = r
n
t + φpit + ut, (2.4)
where φ > 1, in line with the Taylor principle, and where ut is a monetary policy shock, for
which we assume
ut = ρuut−1 + εut , ε
u
t ∼ N (0, σ2u).
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The natural rate, in turn, is defined as the real rate that would prevail absent price and
information rigidities. In our model this implies
rnt ≡ (rt − Etpit+1)|κ=∞ = r¯ + θEt∆ynt+1 = r¯ + θρy∆ynt , (2.5)
where Et denotes expectations under full information.
8 Notice that when potential output
ynt rises, this temporarily raises the natural rate, because it foreshadows a growth path
along which potential output approaches a permanently higher level.
2.3.1.2 Information processing
We assume that households and firms observe the variables it, yt, et and pt (and therefore
pit and ∆et) perfectly, whereas the remaining variables ut, ηt and y
n
t (and therefore r
n
t ,
by equation (2.5)) are unobserved. However, private agents learn about the unobserved
variables as they obtain signals regarding the state of the economy.
More precisely, private agents receive two signals about the unobserved variables. First,
because they can observe pit and yt perfectly, they can infer the sum −κynt + ηt from the
Phillips curve (2.1). However, they cannot distinguish the sum’s individual components.
The disturbance ηt therefore has the natural interpretation of representing noise in the
observation of potential output ynt ; or it may equally be interpreted as any shift in the
Phillips curve that is unrelated with changes in potential output, such as cost push shocks,
or short-term financing frictions that may affect the domestic firms.
The second signal comes from the Taylor rule (2.4). Because private agents observe it
and pit, they can infer the sum r
n
t + ut. Again, they cannot distinguish the sum’s individual
components. In other words, they cannot tell whether a monetary surprise represents a
monetary policy shock ut or a change in the natural rate r
n
t , in line with the arguments of
Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a). In this context we highlight once more that the natural
rate rnt is tied to the growth rate of potential output according to (2.5). The latter is
equally unobserved.
The monetary policy shock ut thus plays a dual role in our analysis. On the one hand, it
is our main object of interest because we study the response of the exchange rate following
8To obtain this equation, we set κ =∞ in the Phillips curve (2.1) which yields yt = ynt . Second, we combine
the equation for the real exchange rate (2.2) and the UIP condition (2.3), and replace yt = y
n
t . Finally, we
set i∗ = r¯ = − log(β) > 0 because the foreign nominal rate i∗ is in its steady state with zero trend inflation.
More details on the linearized model can be found in the appendix.
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a shock to ut. However, shocks to ut are also key for information frictions to impact
macroeconomic dynamics. This is because monetary policy shocks provide a second source
of noise in the observation of the natural rate for private agents. Indeed, in the absence
of monetary policy shocks, while private agents could not infer the natural rate from the
Phillips curve (2.1), they could do so from the Taylor rule (2.4), and the model would
reduce to one of full information.
The key difference between private agents and the central bank in our model is that
the central bank can observe the natural rate perfectly. This can be seen by recognizing
that the central bank sets its policy rate with reference to the natural rate, in the interest
rate feedback rule (2.4). It is not implausible to assume that the central bank has better
information about the natural rate than the private sector for two reasons. First, as argued
by Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a), it is optimal for the central bank in this class of models
to set the policy rate with reference to the natural rate. Second, the central bank employs
a “legion of PhD economists” who carry out its task to track the natural rate.
At this stage we reemphasize the main difference of our model relative to the model of
Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a). In their model, a monetary innovation always represents
a composite disturbance, as it represents a simultaneous tightening of monetary policy and
a rise in the natural rate. In contrast, we construct a model of noisy information in order
to separate these two kinds of disturbances: in our setup, shocks to ut or r
n
t represent
independent sources of variation.
Given the above considerations it is straightforward to specify how private agents
form expectations. From the previous discussion we have seen that private agents receive
two signals about the state of potential output ynt and the monetary shock ut: the sums
−κynt + ηt and rnt + ut − r¯ = θρy∆ynt + ut, where ∆ynt ≡ ynt − ynt−1. This is a linear system.
Thus, under rational expectations private agents form their beliefs using the linear Kalman
filter—as in the noisy information models described in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012).
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Formally, we obtain a state-space representation: y
n
t
ynt−1
ut
 = F
y
n
t−1
ynt−2
ut−1
+
ε
y
t
0
εut
 =
1 + ρy −ρy 01 0 0
0 0 ρu

y
n
t−1
ynt−2
ut−1
+
ε
y
t
0
εut

st = H
 y
n
t
ynt−1
ut
+(ηt
0
)
=
(
−κ 0 0
θρy −θρy 1
) y
n
t
ynt−1
ut
+(ηt
0
)
where st are the two signals (or “sums”) described above.
The Kalman filter yields a recursive formula for expectations E˜t
E˜t
 y
n
t
ynt−1
ut
 = FE˜t−1
y
n
t−1
ynt−2
ut−1
+Kt
st −HFE˜t−1
y
n
t−1
ynt−2
ut−1

 . (2.6)
We compute the Kalman-gain matrix Kt numerically, assuming, as is standard in the
literature, that the agents’ learning problem has already converged such that matrix
Kt = K is time-invariant (e.g., Lorenzoni, 2009).
2.3.2 Estimation
We estimate our model on the basis of an indirect inference approach (Gourieroux et
al., 1993; Smith, 2008). Indirect inference estimation relies on finding parameters such that
an implied moment of the model matches the same moment that characterizes the data—in
our case, we match the impulse response functions following a monetary shock displayed in
Figure 2.1 above. In the language of Nakamura and Steinsson (2018b) we seek to match an
“identified moment” rather than an unconditional moment.
This approach comes with several advantages. First, as explained in Nakamura and
Steinsson (2018b), it is relatively robust to misspecification in the structural model because
the matching procedure relies only on the part of the model that is needed to generate the
particular moment. Second, this approach is also robust to misspecification in the empirical
model that is used to generate the moment (the “auxiliary model”), because for indirect
inference to work, the “auxiliary model need not be correctly specified” (Smith, 2008).
For the purpose at hand this matters, because the empirical impulse response functions
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in Figure 2.1 have been obtained on the basis of identification assumptions which are not
generally satisfied by our structural model (e.g., Mertens and Ravn, 2011).9 Finally, indirect
inference is identical to maximum likelihood if the auxiliary model is correctly specified.
We fix the behavioral parameters to reasonable values and only estimate the shock
parameters, which we summarize in vector ϕ = [ρu, ρy, σy, ση]
′. These are of particular
interest, because the relative size of the variances of the shocks determines the extent
of information frictions in our model. Notice that the standard deviation of monetary
innovations σu is not included in the vector of parameters to be estimated. This is because
the Kalman filter output (2.6) only depends on variance (signal-to-noise) ratios, but not on
the individual levels of the variances. Therefore, without loss of generality we may fix one
of the variances in the estimation. We set σu = 0.1.
We chose the following remaining parameter values. We set β = 0.99, as we assume
that a period in the model corresponds to one quarter. Hence, the real interest rate in
steady state amounts to one percent per quarter. We use the conventional value for the
Taylor coefficient and set φ = 1.5. For the Phillips curve we use a slope of κ = 0.01, in
line with estimates by Gali and Gertler (1999). Finally, for the IES we assume θ−1 = 0.25.
According to Hall (1988) there is no strong evidence for the IES to be different from zero.
Other studies have found higher values (e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2007, report a value of
about 0.7).
For the estimation we proceed as follows. For each parameter draw ϕ we solve the
model numerically and simulate a sequence of 234 observations for the (annualized) nominal
interest rate, output, the CPI and the nominal exchange rate.10 We drop the first 100
observations as burn-in period and treat the remaining observations in the same way as
the actual time-series data: we run local projections and estimate the impulse response
functions for all variables to a monetary policy innovation εut . Importantly, at this stage we
use the same specification for the local projections as in Figure 2.1, that is, a lag structure
of J = 4 and K = 4. We also impose that output and the price level do not respond
instantaneously to the shock. We repeat the regression stage 500 times and take the average
9Output and prices are not predetermined in our structural model, but following Coibion et al. (2017)
we assume this to be the case in our empirical model (2.1). This also rules out direct impulse response
matching as, for instance, in Christiano et al. (2005).
10In our model, pt is the producer price index (PPI) whereas the estimation uses on the consumer price
index (CPI), which in our model is cpit = (1− ω)pt + ωet (see the appendix for details). This implies that
one additional behavioral parameter, the degree of openness ω ∈ (0, 1), needs to be fixed in the estimation.
We use ω = 0.15, because imports account for roughly 15% of GDP in the US in our sample.
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Parameter ρy ρu σy ση
Estimate .749(.081) .960(.003) .063(.011) .007(.002)
Statistic Kest1 /((θρy)/κ) K
est
2 /1
Value .022 .338
Table 2.1: Parameter estimates (standard errors in parentheses) based on indirect inference
procedure and implied noise statistics (see the main text for details).
of the impulse responses to eliminate sample noise. Finally, we compute the (weighted)
squared distance of the implied impulse responses to the empirical impulse responses from
Figure 2.1
ϕˆ = argminϕ (Λˆ
emp − Λˆsim(ϕ))′Σ−1(Λˆemp − Λˆsim(ϕ)), (2.7)
where Λˆemp are the (vectorized) empirical impulse responses, Λˆsim are the simulated
impulse responses which depend on the parameter draw ϕ, and ϕˆ is our estimated vector
of parameters. The matrix Σ is a diagonal weighting matrix which contains the variance
(point-wise) of the empirical impulse response functions. Therefore, our estimator ensures
that the model-implied impulse response functions are as close to the empirical ones as
possible, in terms of point-wise standard deviations.
Table 2.1 shows the results. For the natural rate process we estimate an autocorrelation
of ρy = 0.749. In turn, the standard deviation of the innovations is estimated at σy = 0.063.
As for the monetary policy shock, we estimate a high autocorrelation of ρu = 0.96.
11 Lastly,
the standard deviation of the noise ηt is estimated to be ση = 0.007. We also report standard
deviations of our parameter estimates in parentheses.12
Figure 2.5 shows the impulse response functions of the estimated structural model (red
11In our model, we have abstracted from interest rate smoothing in the Taylor rule. Therefore, the persistence
of the federal funds rate observed empirically is absorbed by a high autocorrelation of the monetary shocks.
In this sense, our estimates are compatible with earlier estimates by Smets and Wouters (2007).
12To compute the standard deviations, we follow Hall et al. (2012) and use
Σϕ = Λϕ
[
∂Λˆsim(ϕ)
∂ϕ
|ϕ=ϕˆ
]′
Σ−1ΣSΣ
−1
[
∂Λˆsim(ϕ)
∂ϕ
|ϕ=ϕˆ
]
Λϕ,
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Figure 2.5: Theoretical (model-based) versus empirical impulse response functions (see
Figure 2.1). The theoretical impulse response functions are dashed in red. The shocks
underlying the theoretical impulse response functions are estimated by using an indirect
inference approach, see the description in the text.
dashed lines) and compares them to our baseline empirical impulse response functions from
Figure 2.1. We find that the model is able to replicate the empirical patterns well. For
example, it is able to generate a hump-shaped response of real GDP. The fact that noisy
information models are able to generate humps has already been stressed by Mackowiak and
Wiederholt (2015). Importantly, the model response tracks the response for the nominal
where Λϕ and ΣS are defined as
Λϕ ≡
([
∂Λˆsim(ϕ)
∂ϕ
|ϕ=ϕˆ
]′
Σ−1
[
∂Λˆsim(ϕ)
∂ϕ
|ϕ=ϕˆ
])−1
, ΣS ≡ Σ + 1
5002
500∑
j=1
Σj ,
where Σj is the counterpart of matrix Σ in the jth replication of our model-implied impulse response
functions. See also Mertens and Ravn (2011) who perform an identical procedure.
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exchange rate very well—our key variable of interest. Hence, the estimated model is able to
generate undershooting, the feature of exchange rate dynamics conditional on monetary
policy shocks that stands out in the data.
2.3.3 Measuring the extent of information frictions
We inspect the mechanism by which information frictions impact exchange rate dynamics
in the next section. Before doing so, we quantify the extent of information frictions in
the model that is implied by our estimates. This assessment reveals to which extent these
frictions are required in order to generate impulse response functions which we see in the
data.
To set the stage, we note that when there is full information, agents perfectly observe
the realization of any random variable xt in the model: E˜txt = xt. Full information is
nested in the model for σ2η = 0 in which case there is no noise in the Phillips curve (2.1):
by observing the two signals, private agents can perfectly distinguish changes in potential
output ynt and monetary policy shocks ut. Full information implies for the monetary shock
ut, the last row in the Kalman filter output (2.6):
ut = ρut−1 +
(
K full1 K
full
2
)(−κ 0 0
θρy −θρy 1
)y
n
t − (1 + ρy)ynt−1 + ρyynt−2
0
ut − ρuut−1,
 .
Here (K full1 ,K
full
2 ) denotes the last row of the Kalman matrix K under full information.
For this equation to hold, it must be that K full1 = (θρy)/κ and K
full
2 = 1. At the opposite
end, when there is zero information about the monetary policy shock, it is clear that
Kzero1 = K
zero
2 = 0 for in this case, agents attach zero weight to new information contained
in any of the two signals.13
This implies that the estimated Kalman filter coefficients lie in the two intervals
Kest1 ∈ [0, (θρy)/κ] and Kest2 ∈ [0, 1]. It also provides a first interesting statistic about the
degree of noisy information implied by our estimates. If Kest is estimated to be closer to
the upper bound in its interval, there is a small degree of noisy information. Conversely, for
13To generate zero information in this model, it is not sufficient to set the noise variance to infinity σ2η =∞.
This is because while in this case, the signal which stems from the Phillips curve becomes uninformative
(recall equation (2.1)), agents can still infer about the state of the economy from the signal coming from
the Taylor rule (equation (2.4)). Therefore, to have zero inference for the agents about the monetary
shock ut, it must also be that the variance of the natural rate shock is large. Put differently, σ
2
y =∞.
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estimates Kest closer to zero the degree of noisy information is high.
The last two rows of Table 2.1 show the results. We express Kest relative to full
information. By using this normalization, numbers closer to one provide a relative distance
to the case of full information. We obtain 0.022 for the first and 0.338 for the second
signal, respectively. Recalling that the first signal comes from the Phillips curve whereas
the second signal comes from the Taylor rule, we conclude that agents can infer close to
nothing about the monetary policy shock from the Phillips curve, and use about one third
of the signal coming from the Taylor rule to update their belief about monetary policy
shocks—both indicating a high estimated degree of noisy information. Although based
on an entirely different approach and data set, our estimates are thus consistent with the
finding of Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a): they find that about two thirds of monetary
innovations in the Taylor rule are perceived to be natural-rate innovations, and only one
third representing monetary policy shocks.
We may also compute a composite statistic which merges the two previous statistics
into one. As described in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), in the presence of two
signals, a composite statistic can be obtained by multiplying the Kalman matrix K with
the observation matrix H. Because we are interested in the noise when observing monetary
shocks, we again evaluate the last row of the resulting matrix (compare equation (2.6)).
Our statistic is the last entry in this resulting vector, for this entry determines the weight
given in the two signals to monetary policy shocks.
As one can verify, in our case this statistic equals Kest2 ∈ [0, 1], and is thus the same
as the weight given to signals in the Taylor rule discussed above. Here we had found that
Kest2 = 0.338. Therefore, the overall degree of information processing regarding monetary
policy shocks is estimated to be about one third. This is in line with estimates for the noisy
information models in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012).
2.4 Inspecting the mechanism
In this section we zoom into the details of the transmission mechanism of our model. This
allows us to explore how information frictions shape exchange rate dynamics in response to
monetary policy shocks. To set the stage, we first consider the full information benchmark.
We consider the case of noisy information afterwards. In a last section we dissect the driving
forces which shape the estimated impulse response functions in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.6: Adjustment to shocks under full information. Dashed line: response to natural
rate shock; solid line: monetary policy shock. All variables are expressed in percent
relative to steady state. Inflation and interest rates are annualized. Parameter values as
set/estimated in Section 2.3, except for σ2η = 0 and ρy = ρu = 0.8.
2.4.1 Full information responses
As explained earlier above, our model nests the case of full information for σ2η = 0. For
this case, we consider how the economy reacts to a shock to potential output and to a
monetary policy shock in turn. Results are shown in Figure 2.6. In order to solve the model
numerically, we use the estimated parameters from Section 2.3 except that we set σ2η = 0
as explained before, and that we use ρy = ρu = 0.8 to facilitate the visual comparison of
impulse responses across the two shocks. The figure therefore provides a qualitative (not
so much a quantitative) illustration of how the model works under full information—a
prerequisite for understanding the model with noisy information below.
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Focus first on the shock to potential output (dashed), which rises initially until it settles
on a permanently higher level. The natural rate rises, foreshadowing the growth path of
potential output. In response to the increase of the natural rate, the central bank raises
its policy rate. As a result, output follows potential output and inflationary pressure does
not arise. This is a standard “divine coincidence” result and underlines the importance of
the central bank tracking the natural rate in our model. In doing so, it closes the output
gap and stabilizes domestic inflation (see, for instance, Gal´ı, 2015). Observe also that the
real exchange rate depreciates permanently in response to the shock, brought about by a
permanent nominal depreciation. This is a supply effect: as the supply of domestic goods
rises permanently, their price declines on world markets—that is, the real exchange rate
depreciates.
Next, we focus on the effect of a monetary policy shock, represented by the solid lines.
The central bank tightens interest rates for reasons exogenous to the economy. Potential
output and the natural rate are unchanged. Output declines. As the output gap becomes
negative, inflation is lowered and, as a result, the price level declines permanently. All of
these effects are well known. What is more interesting is the response of the nominal and
the real exchange rate. In particular, we note that the nominal exchange rate appreciates
in the long term, and that it appreciates by more in the short term (see also Figure 2.7
below, which zooms into the response of the nominal exchange rate). Therefore, under full
information, our model features exchange rate overshooting, just like in Dornbusch (1976).
Two equations, in particular, govern the nominal exchange rate response. The first is
equation (2.2), repeated here for convenience:
θyt = et + p
∗ − pt.
This equation determines how the nominal exchange rate reacts in the long run. A monetary
tightening cannot have an effect on output in the long term. However, because it generates
a temporary decline in inflation, the price level pt declines permanently to a lower level,
p∞ < p−1 (recall Figure 2.6). This, in turn, implies that the nominal exchange rate must
appreciate in the long run, even though the monetary contraction is purely transitory,
e∞ < e−1.14
The second equation is the UIP condition (2.3), also repeated here for convenience for
14Of course, the precise levels of p∞ and e∞ are equilibrium objects, determined by the responses of inflation
and the nominal exchange rate in the short term.
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the full information case:
it − i∗ = Et∆et+1.
Note that, in contrast to equation (2.3), here we use the expectation operator Et.
A monetary contraction implies a surprise increase of the policy rate at time 0, i0 > i
∗,
from the Taylor rule (2.4). While by definition, this is unanticipated in period 0, after
period 0 all fundamental uncertainty is resolved in the experiment under consideration.
This implies that Et∆et+1 = ∆et+1 for all t ≥ 0, because under full information, agents
are not making an expectational error. Dornbusch (1976)’s overshooting result follows
immediately: it − i∗ > 0 implies that ∆et+1 > 0, that is, the nominal exchange rate must
depreciate over time. Because the exchange rate appreciates in the long run, e∞ < e−1,
the way in which both are compatible is that in the initial period 0, the exchange rate
overshoots, e0 < e∞ < e−1.
2.4.2 Exchange rate dynamics when information is noisy
Now, we turn to the case of information frictions. Once the monetary policy shock hits,
private agents observe a policy rate rise. However, they are unable to tell whether this
represents a rise in the natural rate to which monetary policy responds, or a monetary
policy shock. They are therefore unsure whether in the long term, the nominal exchange
rate is going to depreciate or to appreciate (recall Figure 2.6). Because the nominal
exchange rate is a forward looking variable, its current response reflects this uncertainty.
For example, if agents attach a high probability to the rate rise reflecting a change in
the natural rate, the nominal exchange rate may initially depreciate. As agents realize
that the policy rate rise represents a monetary contraction, the exchange rate starts to
appreciate over time. Generally, the model with information frictions can thus account for
overshooting, undershooting or delayed overshooting—depending on the model parameters
which determine how market participants process information.
This intuition can be made precise formally. We repeat equation (2.3) for convenience
it − i∗ = E˜t∆et+1.
Unlike under full information, agents in noisy information models make expectational errors
even absent any fundamental surprises, that is, even after the shock has hit in period zero.
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In fact, in noisy information models, the expectational error only converges to zero in the
long term (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2012). Formally, following a shock to ut in the
initial period, ∆et+1 6= E˜t∆et+1 for all t ≥ 0. Letting vt+1 ≡ ∆et+1 − E˜t∆et+1 denote the
expectational error, we may rewrite the last equation as
it − i∗ + vt+1 = ∆et+1. (2.1)
Equation (2.1) illustrates why our model may not predict exchange rate overshooting to
the extent that information is noisy. Even when the policy rate it rises, a negative enough
expectational error,
vt+1 < 0, (2.2)
can imply a nominal appreciation over time even though the domestic currency carries
a high interest rate. That the expectational error must indeed be negative can again be
understood from the exchange rate response in Figure 2.6. Under noisy information, agents
initially expect the exchange rate to appreciate by less than under full information, from
previous arguments. Over time, as they learn about the monetary policy shock, they realize
that the exchange rate will appreciate. This implies that E˜t∆et+1 > et+1, or that vt+1 < 0.
We illustrate how the nominal exchange rate response changes once we gradually adjust
the noise variance σ2η from zero to a positive value. The result is shown in Figure 2.7,
the right panel. When ση = 0, the nominal exchange rate response is characterized by
overshooting, as in Figure 2.6. As ση is raised, the impact response of the exchange rate
is weakened and—for some time—the exchange rate is appreciating over time rather than
depreciating. For a low level of information frictions, the exchange rate response is thus
characterized by delayed overshooting. Instead, as information frictions become more severe,
the exchange rate response changes from delayed overshooting to undershooting.
Finally, the left panel in Figure 2.7 shows that, whatever the noise variance ση, the
nominal interest rate response is virtually identical. This highlights that, quite independently
of the nominal interest rate response, our model can explain varying shapes of the nominal
exchange rate response, depending on the degree of information frictions and therefore on
the size of the expectational error (see equation (2.1)).
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Figure 2.7: Impulse response functions of the nominal interest rate it and the nominal
exchange rate et following a monetary policy shock. Parameters as estimated in Section
2.3, except σ2η, which we vary from zero to a positive number, and ρy = ρu = 0.8. Compare
Figure 2.6.
2.4.3 Dissecting the estimated nominal exchange rate response
We now dissect the nominal exchange rate response of the estimated model, shown in
Figure 2.5, as we identify its underlying drivers. Step by step we uncover how our empirical
undershooting result can be explained by information frictions.
The upper-left panel in Figure 2.8 decomposes the nominal exchange rate response
according to equation (2.1). Here we therefore split the (change in the) nominal exchange
rate (solid lines) into nominal interest differential (diamonds) plus the expectational error
(dashed lines).
Under full information, the expectational error would be zero in all periods except in
period 0, as argued above. The solid line and the line with diamonds would thus coincide:
a high interest rate would be accompanied by ongoing nominal depreciation. Not so under
noisy information. In this case, the expectational error vt+1 is negative (see equation (2.2)),
which drags down the response of exchange rate changes relative to full information. In our
estimated model, the expectational-error effect is strong enough to overturn the sign of the
change of the exchange rate response from positive to negative for the entire horizon of
the response. Rather than depreciating, the nominal exchange rate appreciates over time
despite a high interest rate. This is the core of our undershooting result.
The remaining three panels show the source of the expectational error vt+1 or, informally,
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Figure 2.8: Adjustments to a monetary policy shock. Upper-left panel: decomposition by
using equation (2.1). Upper-right panel: components of the Taylor rule (2.3). Lower panels:
actual versus perceived evolution of monetary policy shock ut and natural rate r
n
t .
the source of private agents’ expectational error. The upper-right panel decomposes the
Taylor rule (2.4) into its individual components, after applying the expectations operator:
it = E˜tr
n
t + φpit + E˜tut, (2.3)
where we use that E˜tit = it and E˜tpit = pit, because both it and pit are perfectly observed.
As agents observe a policy rate rise it, they (partially) mistake this to be a policy response
to a natural rate rise even though the natural rate has not changed. In fact, a significant
share of the probability weight is initially put on a natural rate disturbance.
The two lower panels reveal this in more detail as they show the perceived response
E˜tut and E˜tr
n
t versus the actual response for these two variables. By looking at the actual
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response, we see that the underlying dynamics in Figure 2.5 is a monetary policy shock
which initially rises to 0.43 percentage points, which slowly returns to zero due to a high
estimated autocorrelation. Instead, the natural rate stays constant at zero. By observing
the response of the economy over time, private agents update their beliefs and adjust their
estimates of the two shocks accordingly. However, it takes more than five years (twenty
quarters) until private agents put their estimate for the natural rate to the true value of
zero, and about three years (twelve quarters) until the private agents’ perception and the
actual evolution of the monetary policy shock roughly coincide.
We conclude that, for the model to match the empirically observed impulse response
functions following a monetary contraction, the required degree of information friction on
monetary policy shocks is substantial.
2.5 External validation
In the previous section we have shown that a model with information frictions is able
to account for the empirical impulse responses to a monetary policy shock. In particular,
it is able to account for the extent of exchange rate undershooting that characterizes our
identified moments. In our estimation, we determine parameter values so as to minimize the
distance between the model predictions and the identified moments. Against this background
it is interesting to confront the predictions of the model with additional evidence, notably
evidence that is not used in the estimation procedure.
2.5.1 The exchange rate response to supply shocks
In our small open economy model a shock to the natural rate that raises potential output
induces the exchange rate to depreciate in the long run. In order to test this prediction of
the model we estimate the response of the effective nominal exchange rate of the US dollar
to technology shocks. For this purpose, we employ once more our empirical model (2.1)
and project the change in the exchange rate at various horizons on TFP innovations as
provided by Fernald (2014).15
Figure 2.9 shows the result. In the left panel we show the result for a sample that is as
close as possible to our baseline. Specifically, it covers the period 1976 - 2007. In this case
we find that the exchange rate depreciates in response to TFP shocks, but the effect is not
15The shock series represents the change in TFP while accounting for changes in utilization.
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Figure 2.9: Exchange rate response to a TFP shock. Solid line represents point estimate,
shaded areas correspond to 68% and 90% confidence intervals, respectively. Time (horizontal
axis) is in quarters. TFP shocks series provided by Fernald (2014).
statistically significant. In the right panel, we use a longer sample. In this case, we do find
a significant depreciation, in line with the predictions of the model.
2.5.2 Monetary policy and growth: reassessing the information effect
A striking observation by Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a) is that in response to a
monetary policy surprise—identified on the basis of high frequency data—survey estimates
of expected output growth increase. This observation is pivotal in order to motivate their
analysis of the information effect. In our analysis we rely on the measure of monetary
policy shocks put forward by Romer and Romer. In this case, shocks are by construction
orthogonal to the information set of the federal reserve. As a result these shocks should
not convey new information about the current or expected state of the economy to market
participants.
Still, it is instructive to assess how growth expectations respond to monetary policy
shocks in the context of our analysis. For this purpose we consider quarterly observations
from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. The left panel of Figure 2.10 correlates the
change in growth expectations one year ahead with Romer-Romer shocks. As in Nakamura
and Steinsson (2018a) who consider monthly observations in Blue Chip survey expectations,
we find a positive association. A regression yields a significant slope coefficient of 0.24.
Taken at face value, one may conjecture that the Romer-Romer shock is not a genuine
monetary policy shock but instead contains some additional information about the economy.
We can use the estimated model to assess this conjecture. Specifically, in the right panel
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Figure 2.10: Left panel: Scatter plot of changes in expected output growth over next year
(quarterly SPF) and Romer, Romer (RR) shocks, slope of linear regression is 0.24. Right
panel: Expectations of output at period zero (E˜0yt) and realized output (yt) in response to
a monetary policy shock both in percentage points. The parameters are as estimated in
Section 2.3.
of Figure 2.10 we display again the impulse response of output to the monetary policy
shock (dashed line). In addition, we also plot the expectation of the future path of output
on impact, that is, just after the shock materializes (solid line). We find that market
participants expect output to grow over time. This is because they assign a high probability
to the possibility that the interest rate increase represents a response to the natural rate,
even thought the economy is subjected to a monetary policy shock. Hence, we conclude
that rising growth expectations do not necessarily imply that monetary policy surprises
carry proper news about the state of the economy. In an economy with information frictions
market participants may revise their growth expectations upward simply because they do
not know the true nature of the shock.
2.6 Conclusion
A number of recent contributions have highlighted the importance of information
frictions in order to account for expectations data and related macroeconomic phenomena.
In this paper, we study how information frictions impact exchange rate dynamics. This is a
first order issue in light of Dornbusch’s overshooting hypothesis where expectations take
center stage and, importantly, are assumed to adjust instantaneously to shocks.
And, indeed, we find that the exchange rate undershoots in response to monetary
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policy shocks if information frictions are pervasive—thereby overturning Dornbusch (1976)’s
original result. Specifically, we put forward a small open economy model with information
frictions. In our model agents do neither observe monetary policy shocks nor the natural
rate directly. Market participants thus attach some probability to the possibility that an
increase in the policy rate is an endogenous policy response to the natural rate, rather than
a monetary policy shock. An increase in the natural rate signals rising potential output
which comes with an exchange rate depreciation. Hence, for as long there is uncertainty
about the true nature of the shock the exchange rate response is muted.
We also provide evidence for undershooting as we estimate the effect of US monetary
policy shocks on the exchange rate and other variables of interest. Specifically, we use local
projections to obtain impulse response functions on which we rely, in turn, to estimate the
structural model on the basis of an indirect inference procedure. The degree of information
friction implied by the estimated model is economically important, and strictly necessary
(in our model) to explain the observed undershooting response. This testifies once more to
the importance of information frictions when it comes to accounting for key macroeconomic
phenomena.
2.A Economic environment
Here we describe the non-linear model in some detail, and present details on the
linearization. Much of the exposition is drawn from Kriwoluzky et al. (2013).
2.A.1 Non-linear model
Final Good Firms The final consumption good, Ct, is a composite of intermediate
goods produced by a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms both at home and
abroad. We use j ∈ [0, 1] to index intermediate goods. Final good firms operate under
perfect competition and purchase domestically produced intermediate goods, Yt(j), as well
as imported intermediate goods, YI,t(j). Final good firms minimize expenditures subject to
the following aggregation technology
Ct =
(1− ω) 1σ

 1∫
0
Yt(j)
−1
 dj


−1

σ−1
σ
+ ω
1
σ

 1∫
0
YI,t(j)
−1
 dj


−1

σ−1
σ

σ
σ−1
,
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(2.A.1)
where σ > 0 is the trade price elasticity. The parameter  > 1 measures the price elasticity
across intermediate goods produced within the same country, while ω ∈ (0, 1) measures the
weight of imports in the production of final consumption goods—a value lower than one
corresponds to home bias in consumption.
Expenditure minimization implies the following price indices for domestically produced
intermediate goods and imported intermediate goods, respectively,
Pt =
 1∫
0
Pt(j)
1−di

1
1−
, PI,t =
 1∫
0
PI,t(j)
1−di

1
1−
. (2.A.2)
By the same token, the consumption price index is
CPIt =
(
(1− ω)P 1−σt + ωP 1−σI,t
) 1
1−σ
. (2.A.3)
Regarding the rest of the world (ROW), we assume an isomorphic aggregation technology.
Further, the law of one price is assumed to hold at the level of intermediate goods such
that
PI,t = P
∗
t Et, (2.A.4)
where Et denotes the nominal exchange rate (the price of foreign currency in terms of
domestic currency). P ∗t denotes the price index of imports measured in foreign currency.
We also define the terms of trade and the real exchange rate as
St =
PI,t
Pt
, Qt =
P ∗t Et
CPIt
, (2.A.5)
respectively. While the law of one price holds throughout, deviations from purchasing power
parity are possible in the short run, due to home bias in consumption.
Intermediate Good Firms Intermediate goods are produced on the basis of the
following production function: Yt(j) = Ht(j), where Ht(j) measures the amount of labor
employed by firm j. Intermediate good firms operate under imperfect competition. We
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assume that price setting is constrained exogenously a` la Calvo. Each firm has the
opportunity to change its price with a given probability 1 − ξ. Given this possibility, a
generic firm j will set Pt(j) in order to solve
max E˜t
∞∑
k=0
ξkρt,t+k
[
Y dt,t+k(j)Pt(j)−Wt+kHt+k(j)
]
, (2.A.6)
where ρt,t+k denotes the nominal stochastic discount factor and Y
d
t,t+k(j) denotes demand in
period t+ k, given that prices have been set optimally in period t. Note that expectations
have a tilde E˜t to indicate the presence of incomplete information.
Households The domestic economy is inhabited by a representative household that
ranks sequences of consumption and labor effort as
E˜t
∞∑
k=0
βk
(
C1−θt+k
1− θ −
H1+ϕt+k
1 + ϕ
)
, β ∈ (0, 1) (2.A.7)
The household trades a complete set of state-contingent securities with the rest of the world.
Letting Ξt+1 denote the payoff in units of domestic currency in period t+ 1 of the portfolio
held at the end of period t, the budget constraint of the household is given by
WtHt + Υt − PtCt = E˜tρt,t+1Ξt+1 − Ξt, (2.A.8)
where Υt denote lump-sum profits of intermediate good firms.
Monetary policy Domestic monetary policy is specified by an interest rate feedback
rule. Defining the one-period interest rate as It ≡ 1/E˜t(ρt,t+1), we posit
It = R
n
t Π
φ
t Ut, φ > 1, (2.A.9)
where Πt = Pt/Pt−1 measures domestic inflation and (here as well as in the following), Rnt
is the natural rate and Ut is a monetary policy shock.
Market clearing At the level of each intermediate good, supply equals demand of final
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good firms and the ROW:
Yt(j) = Y
d
t (j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−( Pt
CPIt
)−σ
((1− ω)Ct + ωSσt C∗t ) , (2.A.10)
where C∗t denotes consumption in the ROW. It is convenient to define an index for aggregate
domestic output:
Yt =
 1∫
0
Yt(j)
(−1)/dj
/(−1) .
Substituting for Yt(j) using (2.A.10) gives the aggregate relationship
Yt =
(
Pt
CPIt
)−σ
((1− ω)Ct + ωSσt C∗t ) . (2.A.11)
2.A.2 Equilibrium conditions and the linearized model
In the following, we use lower-case letters to denote the log of a variable. Variables in
the ROW are assumed to be constant throughout.
Price indices The terms of trade, the law of one price, the CPI, CPI inflation and the
real exchange rate can be written as
st = pI,t − pt, (2.A.12)
pI,t = p
∗ + et, (2.A.13)
cpit = (1− ω)pt + ωpI,t = pt + ωst, (2.A.14)
∆cpit = pit + ω∆st, (2.A.15)
qt = (1− ω)st. (2.A.16)
Intermediate good firms The demand for intermediate good (j) is given by
Yt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−ε
Yt, (2.A.17)
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so that
1∫
0
Yt(j)dj = ζtYt, (2.A.18)
where ζt =
1∫
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−ε
dj measures price dispersion. Aggregation gives
ζtYt =
1∫
0
Ht(j)dj = Ht. (2.A.19)
A first order approximation is given by yt = ht.
The first order condition to the price setting problem is given by
E˜t
∞∑
k=0
ξkρt,t+k
[
Y dt,t+k(j)Pt(j)−
ε
ε− 1Wt+kHt+k
]
= 0. (2.A.20)
Linearizing (2.A.20) around zero inflation, one obtains a variant of the New Keynesian
Phillips curve (see, e.g., Gal´ı and Monacelli, 2005a):
pit = βE˜tpit+1 + λmˆc
r
t , (2.A.21)
where λ := (1− ξ)(1− βξ)/ξ and marginal costs are defined in real terms, deflated with
the domestic price index
mcrt = wt − pt = wrt + ωst. (2.A.22)
Here, a hat ·ˆ indicates log-deviation from steady state, and wrt = wt − cpit is the real wage
deflated with the CPI.
Households The first order conditions in deviations from steady state are
wrt = wt − cpit = θct + ϕht, (2.A.23)
ct = E˜tct+1 − 1
θ
(it − E˜t∆cpit+1 − ρ), (2.A.24)
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where ρ = − log(β) > 0. Risk sharing implies that consumption is tightly linked to the real
exchange rate (see, e.g., Gal´ı and Monacelli, 2005a)
θct = qt. (2.A.25)
Monetary policy Rewriting the interest rate feedback rule gives
it = r
n
t + φpit + ut. (2.A.26)
Equilibrium Linearizing the good market clearing condition (2.A.11) yields
yt = (2− ω)σωst + (1− ω)ct, (2.A.27)
where we use (2.A.12)-(2.A.15) and set c∗ = 0.
Key equations We show how to obtain equations (2.1)-(2.3) from the main text (the
New Keynesian Phillips curve, the risk sharing condition and the UIP condition).
Combine good market clearing (2.A.27), risk sharing (2.A.25) and the definition of the
real exchange rate (2.A.16) to obtain
yt =
1
θ
(1 + ω(2− ω)(σθ − 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=$
st, (2.A.28)
We assume that σ = 1/θ (the so called Cole-Obstfeld condition), in which case $ = 1.
Rearrange to obtain
st = θyt. (2.A.29)
Combine with equations (2.A.12) and (2.A.13) to obtain equation (2.2) in the main text.
Rewrite the Euler equation (2.A.24)
ct = E˜tct+1 − 1
θ
(it − E˜t(pit+1 + ω∆st+1)− ρ) (2.A.30)
= E˜tct+1 − 1
θ
(it − E˜tpit+1 + ωθE˜t∆yt+1 − ρ), (2.A.31)
where we use (2.A.15) in the first line and (2.A.29) in the second.
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Combine (2.A.29) with (2.A.25) and (2.A.16) to obtain
ct = (1− ω)yt. (2.A.32)
Use this expression to substitute for consumption in (2.A.31)
yt = E˜tyt+1 − 1
θ
(it − E˜tpit+1 − ρ), (2.A.33)
which is the dynamic IS curve. The same equation holds in ROW. Using that p∗ is constant
and therefore that pi∗ = 0, and using that y∗ = c∗ = 0, this implies i∗ = ρ. Using this and
combining the DIS curve (2.A.33) with equation (2.2) from the main text, we obtain the
UIP condition (2.3) from the main text.
Finally, we rewrite the Phillips curve (2.A.21). We use (2.A.23), (2.A.29), (2.A.32) and
production technology yt = ht to rewrite marginal cost
mcrt = w
r
t + ωst = θct + ϕht + ωst = (θ + ϕ)yt. (2.A.34)
Insert this into the Phillips curve (2.A.21) and define κ ≡ λ(θ + ϕ) to obtain equation (2.1)
in the main text.
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Chapter 3
Is the German current account surplus too large?
Joint with Marc Faupel
3.1 Introduction
The German current account in percent of GDP has remained at an elevated level since
2007 with a peak of 10% in 2016 as illustrated in Figure 3.1. Given such high numbers
there is an ongoing debate on whether the German current account surplus is too large. For
example, The Economist (2017) argues that the large surplus amplified the crises in some
southern-European countries and that it unreasonably strains the global trading system.
Further, IMF (2017) sees the surplus above what is implied by economic fundamentals
and recommends policies to narrow the surplus such as increasing public investment. The
German Federal Ministry of Finance (2017) on the contrary, regards the surplus as a market
outcome which is driven, for example, by increased savings of an aging population.
We use the so called intertemporal approach to the current account as a benchmark to
judge whether the German current account surplus is too large. According to this approach,
the current account predicts changes in the present value of future income (net of investment
and government spending). The underlying mechanism of this prediction is the desire to
smooth consumption of a representative household. Hence, a country runs a current account
surplus when it expects future income to decline. The cross-equation restriction of the
intertemporal model on a vector autoregression (VAR) has been tested empirically several
times (for early test see e.g. Sheffrin and Woo, 1990; Otto, 1992). It turns out that the
predicted current account often resembles the true current account strikingly well, although
the cross-equation restriction is frequently rejected by the data.1 More recently, Bergin
and Sheffrin (2000) improve the fit of the model by extending the simple representative
1See for example the discussion in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). For a comprehensive survey of papers that
tested the intertemporal approach see Herzberg (2015).
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Figure 3.1: German current account in percent of GDP, seasonally adjusted, range is from
1991-Q1 to 2017-Q4; source: OECD.
household model to include non-separable utility between tradable and non-tradable goods
and a time-varying world interest and exchange rate.
In order to answer our question, we use the intertemporal approach of Bergin and
Sheffrin (2000). For this purpose we estimate a VAR for Germany and find that the
cross-equation restrictions of the intertemporal model cannot be rejected. Hence, it cannot
be rejected that the German current account is explained by the intertemporal approach.
Further, the current account which is predicted by the cross-equation restrictions matches
the large surplus. Therefore, the German current account surplus appears justified from
the perspective of the intertemporal approach.
We are not the first ones to analyze the large German current account surplus. Kollmann
et al. (2015) estimate a large-scale DSGE model to quantify which of the about 40 shocks
drive the German current account. They find that shocks to the German savings rate account
for about half of the surplus after 2008. In his comment to Kollmann et al. (2015), Mu¨ller
94
3.2. Related literature
(2015) discusses potential driving forces of the savings shock including the consumption
smoothing incentive within the intertemporal model. For this purpose he analyzes to which
extend a further prediction of the intertemporal model explains the current account surplus.
The prediction is that a country runs a current account surplus if it expects a declining
share in world output (Engel and Rogers, 2006). He finds that the surplus can be justified
by this prediction since the implied world output share of the intertemporal model for
Germany is in line with its projected path by the OECD.
Related to our analysis Campa and Gavilan (2011) evaluate the sustainability of the
external imbalances of some countries of the European Monetary Union using the setup
put forward in Bergin and Sheffrin (2000). To this end they compute whether growth
expectations that drive the current account are in line with historical growth rates. For
example, Spain’s growth expectations appear to have been overoptimistic prior to the
financial crisis.2 Bussiere et al. (2018) also use the model of Bergin and Sheffrin (2000) to
analyze the current account of some major advanced economies (G7 minus the US). They,
however, do not test the intertemporal model as we do here but focus on the sources of
current account fluctuations.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the literature
on the intertemporal approach in more detail, briefly discusses critique put forward against
the intertemporal approach and motivates our choice to use the model of Bergin and Sheffrin
(2000). Section 3.3 shortly describes their model. Section 3.4 presents the data and discusses
the parameterization. We discuss our results in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6 we conduct a
Monte Carlo analysis to shed further light on our results. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Related literature
The intertemporal approach to the current account dates back to Sachs (1981, 1982)
who highlighted that the current account should not be analyzed in a static environment.
Forward looking consumers will take expectations of their future income into account
and adjust their consumption/savings already today. This prediction is analogue to the
permanent income hypothesis. In consequence, methods developed to test the permanent
income hypothesis (Campbell, 1987; Campbell and Shiller, 1987) have then been applied
within the intertemporal approach to the current account. As already mentioned in the
2The authors do not conduct this exercise for Germany since they reject the intertemporal model for
Germany. This might be due to the shorter sample in their analysis which runs from 1991Q1-2005Q4.
95
3.2. Related literature
introduction, early tests found the cross-equations restrictions of the intertemporal model
frequently rejected although the predicted current account had a good visual fit to the
actual current account. These early tests were conducted in a “simple model” of a small
open economy in which households receive an exogenous stochastic endowment and can
borrow an internationally traded risk-free bond at a constant world interest rate.
The simple intertemporal model has been extended in many directions. For example,
Ahmed (1986), Ahmed and Rogers (1995) and Bussie`re et al. (2010) among others study the
role of government spending shocks on the current account. Bergin and Sheffrin (2000) take
a different approach and analyze a version of the intertemporal model with tradable and
non-tradable goods together with a time-varying world interest and exchange rate. Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) compare a variety of extensions that make the intertemporal model
stationary. For instance, they consider a debt-elastic interest-rate premium within the
intertemporal framework. In order to understand why the simple intertemporal model is
frequently rejected, Nason and Rogers (2006) conduct a Monte Carlo analysis with the
above extensions for Canadian data. They confirm that extending the model with stochastic
interest rates—as in Bergin and Sheffrin (2000)—helps to explain the rejection of the simple
intertemporal model for Canada. Further, they find that a combination of an internalized
debt-elastic interest rate premium together with a stochastic world interest rate matches
the Canadian data best.
The intertemporal approach abstracts from valuation effects of the net foreign asset
position. Gourinchas and Rey (2014) consider this neglect as responsible for the rejection
of the intertemporal model. To illustrate this, the change in the net foreign asset position
can be decomposed as follows:3
NFAt −NFAt−1 = CAt + V At, (3.2.1)
where NFAt denotes the net foreign asset position at market values of a given country at
the end of period t. The current account is given by CAt while V At denotes the valuation
adjustment. The intertemporal model requires that a country with a current account
deficit has to run future current account surpluses. Instead, when valuation effects are
considered, the adjustment in the net foreign asset position can also be brought about by a
revaluation of net foreign assets (Gourinchas and Rey, 2007). For example, if the liabilities
3This representation still abstracts from changes in the capital account, unilateral transfers and the statistical
discrepancy, all of which are typically small for industrialized countries, see Gourinchas and Rey (2014).
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of a given country are mainly denoted in the domestic currency and the foreign assets are
mainly denoted in foreign currency, a depreciation of the exchange rate reduces the need to
run future current account surpluses. Of course, the adjustment can also happen by the
revaluation of the market value of certain assets. Such adjustments are absent in Bergin
and Sheffrin (2000) whose model contains only a single asset. However, the return of this
asset may change stochastically and in this respect approximates valuation effects. Further,
IMF (2018) estimates average valuation changes in the German international investment
position for the period of 2012-2016 to be about only 1% of GDP.4 We consider this as
tolerable.
Since the focus of this paper is to which extent the German current account surplus
can be explained by the intertemporal approach, we consider the model by Bergin and
Sheffrin (2000) best suited for our analysis. First, their extensions improved the fit of the
intertemporal model. Further, the inclusion of a time-varying world interest and exchange
rate approximates valuation effects.
3.3 The intertemporal model of Bergin and Sheffrin
In this section we briefly present the model of Bergin and Sheffrin (2000). In their
model of a small open economy a representative household maximizes expected lifetime
utility by choosing consumption and debt. Formally, the optimization problem is given by:
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(CTt, CNt)
s.t. Yt − (CTt + PtCNt)−It −Gt + rtBt−1 = Bt −Bt−1, with B0 given, (3.3.1)
where CTt denotes consumption of traded and CNt consumption of non-traded goods. Yt is
endowment, It is Investment, Gt is government consumption. These variables are measured
in terms of traded goods. Pt denotes the relative price of non-traded goods in terms of
traded goods. Further, the stock of external assets is denoted by Bt, while rt is the net world
real interest rate in terms of traded goods and may vary exogenously. For the subjective
discount factor it holds that β ∈ (0, 1). Ponzi schemes are not permitted. The utility
4See Figure 3 in their technical supplement III.B.
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function is of the constant relative risk aversion type:
U(CTt, CNt) =
1
1− σ
(
CaT tC
1−a
Nt
)1−σ
, (3.3.2)
where σ > 0 and 0 < a < 1. Further, total consumption expenditure may be written as
Ct = CTt + PtCNt. Optimal policy implies the following variant of the consumption-Euler
equation:5
Et∆ct+1 = γEtr
∗
t+1, (3.3.3)
where ct = logCt and ∆ct+1 = ct+1 − ct. Parameter γ denotes the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution with γ = 1/σ while r∗ is given by:
r∗t = rt +
[
1− γ
γ
(1− a)
]
∆pt + constant, (3.3.4)
with pt = logPt and ∆pt = pt − pt−1 and where the world interest rate in terms of traded
goods is approximated as log(1 + rt) ≈ rt. Further, r∗t can be interpreted as a consumption
based real interest rate composed of the real interest rate and changes in the relative price of
nontraded goods, see Bergin and Sheffrin (2000) for a detailed discussion. In the empirical
estimation we demean r∗t such that the constant drops out.
Defining net output as NOt ≡ Yt − It − Gt, the current account can be written as
CAt = NOt − Ct − rtBt−1. Bergin and Sheffrin (2000) log-linearize the lifetime budget
constraint of the household assuming a steady state where net foreign assets are zero.
Combining it with the Euler equation (3.3.3) yields
not − ct = −Et
∞∑
i=1
βi
[
∆not+i − γr∗t+i
]
, (3.3.5)
with not = logNOt and ∆not = not − not−1. The left hand side of the above equation
resembles the definition of the current account except that its components are in logs.
Defining CA∗t ≡ not− ct as the transformed representation of the current account, equation
5See Bergin and Sheffrin (2000) for a detailed derivation.
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(3.3.5) can be rewritten as:
CA∗t = −Et
∞∑
i=1
βi
[
∆not+i − γr∗t+i
]
. (3.3.6)
According to equation (3.3.6), the current account variable, CA∗t , should include all of
consumers’ information on future changes of net output and of the consumption based
interest rate. We test the validity of this equation in two different ways as it has been
often done in the intertemporal approach. For the first test, we need to elicit consumers’
expectations of future realizations of net output and the consumption based interst rate.
For this purpose, we estimate the following VAR: ∆noCA∗
r∗

t
=
 a11 a12 a13a21 a22 a23
a31 a32 a33

 ∆noCA∗
r∗

t−1
+
 u1tu2t
u3t
 . (3.3.7)
As argued by Ghosh (1995) the current account variable is included in the regression
because under the null that the intertemporal model holds true, it contains all information
of the household which the econometrician has no access to (e.g. expectations of shocks to
government spending). The above VAR can be written more compactly as zt = Azt−1 + ut
with zt = [∆not, CA
∗
t , r
∗
t ]
′ and where ut is a mean zero vector of homoskedastic errors such
that Etzt+i = A
izt. Additional lags can be easily included in this notation by writing the
VAR in the companion form. The VAR includes no constant since we demean all time series
prior to estimation. Given consumers’ forecasts of net output and the consumption based
interest rate from the VAR as specified by equation (3.3.7), we can rewrite equation (3.3.6)
as follows
hzt = −Et
∞∑
i=1
βi(g1 − γg2)Aizt, (3.3.8)
where h = [0 1 0], g1 = [1 0 0] and g2 = [0 0 1]. Defining the right hand side of equation
(3.3.8) as the predicted current account variable, ĈA
∗
t , we have that:
ĈA
∗
t = kzt, (3.3.9)
where k = −(g1 − γg2)βA(I − βA)−1. If the intertemporal model holds true, then it
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must hold that CA∗ = ĈA
∗
t . Therefore, according to the intertemporal model the k-vector
should be given by k = [0 1 0]. This is a testable cross-equation restriction on the estimated
VAR and dates back to Campbell (1987). Making use of the delta method, Bergin and
Sheffrin (2000) show that the difference between the actual and the hypothesized value of k
is χ2-distributed with 3 degrees of freedom.6 We call this the k-test. Below, we also plot
ĈA
∗
t against CA
∗
t for a visual comparison between the actual and the predicted current
account variable allowing us to judge whether the German current account surplus is in
line with predictions of the intertemporal model.
The second test also dates back to Campbell (1987). To derive this test we rewrite
equation (3.3.6) as:
EtCA
∗
t+1 = Et∆not+1 − γEtr∗t+1 +
1
β
CA∗t . (3.3.10)
Defining Rt ≡ CA∗t − (∆not− γr∗t )− (1/β)CA∗t−1, equation (3.3.10) implies that Rt should
be unpredictable given past information. Formally, it should hold that Et(Rt|It−1) = 0,
where It−1 summarizes all information up to and including period t− 1. Hence, variable
Rt should be unpredictable according to the intertemporal model. We call this the R-test,
which we conduct by regressing Rt on past values of CA
∗
t , ∆not and r
∗
t and by testing the
joint nullity of the coefficients.
3.4 Data and parameter values
Our empirical analysis is based on quarterly data which are seasonally adjusted at annual
rates. Because of the German reunification our sample starts in 1991-Q1 and runs until
2017-Q4. The data are retrieved from the International Financial Statistics (IFS), published
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), unless otherwise stated. We construct the series
for net output by subtracting government expenditure (Gt) and investment expenditure
(It) from GDP (Yt). The current account variable (CA
∗
t ) is defined as the difference of log
net output and the log of private consumption expenditure (Ct). All variables are adjusted
by the GDP-deflator and are expressed as per-capita ratios.
The consumption based interest rate (r∗) is calculated according to (3.3.4). We compute
the real world interest rate (rt) following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990). That is, we adjust
6Below we also test a simpler version of the intertemporal model without time varying interest rates. In
this case and when we consider further lags in the VAR the k-vector and its components are adjusted
appropriately as is the number of degrees of freedom.
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the short term nominal interest rates of the G-7 economies by inflation expectations in
order to get an “ex-ante” real interest rate. Short term nominal interest rates are from the
OECD database because of better data availability. For Japan, however, we take the IFS
Treasury Bill rate also due to data availability. Inflation expectations in each country are
estimated by a six-quarter autoregression using the respective country’s consumer price
index.7 In order to compute the world real interest rate we weight each country-specific
real rate by its time-varying share of real GDP in the G-7.8
The second component required to compute the consumption based interest rate, r∗,
is a measure of the ex-ante expectation of Pt. Following Bergin and Sheffrin (2000) and
Rogoff (1992), we use the real exchange rate as a proxy for Pt. For this purpose, we take
the real effective exchange rate based on Germany’s Consumer Price Index from the IFS.
We estimate a six-quarter autoregression of this series and take logs and first differences in
order to compute the ex-ante expected exchange rate appreciation/depreciation (Et−1∆pt).
Finally, as mentioned above the series for ∆no, CA∗ and r∗ are all demeaned.
We further need to assign parameter values. The discount factor β is computed as
β = 1/(1 + r¯), where r¯ is the average world interest rate.9 For our sample we get β = 0.99.
For the share of traded goods in private final consumption we take the estimate from Campa
and Gavilan (2011) for Germany of a = 0.36 which is estimated from the input-output
information provided by Eurostat with data from 1995. In a robustness analysis we also
consider a lower value for a because the share of traded-goods in consumption is commonly
expected to have declined in developed countries due to the growth of the service sector.
Finally, we have to assign a value for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution γ.
As we will show below, our results are sensitive to the choice of γ. Following Bergin and
Sheffrin (2000), we choose γ in our baseline specification such that the variance of the
predicted current account variable, ĈA
∗
, matches the variance of its counterpart in the
data, CA∗.10 For our baseline specification we get γ = 0.047 which is in line with Hall
(1988). In a robustness check we choose γ = 0.4 in order to accommodate estimates for the
coefficient of relative risk aversion σ (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). In another specification,
7The CPI-series start in 1989 in order to determine inflation expectations for our first sample period in
1991-Q1. For Germany the CPI series starts only in 1991-Q1, which is why we omit Germany in the
computation of the world interest rate until 1992-Q3.
8The real GDP data are retrieved from the Worldbank’s World Development Indicators.
9Sachs (1982) allows the discount factor to differ from 1/(1 + r¯). In that case there is a “consumption-tilting”
motive: depending on time preferences relative to the world interest rate consumers move consumption to
the present or to the future, see also Ghosh (1995).
10This, however, reduces the degrees of freedom of the χ2-statistic of the k-test and of the R-test by one.
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Bergin and Sheffrin (2000) choose γ to minimize the χ2-statistic of the k-test. In our case
this yields a negative value for γ such that we refrain from this specification.
Before estimating the VAR we test whether the time series are stationary. We find
that both the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test reject
the presence of a unit root for the net output series (logged and in first differences) and
the consumption based interest rate, see Table 3.1. In line with these results, the KPSS
test does not reject the null of stationarity for both series. The ADF and the PP test,
however, do not reject the hypothesis that a unit root is present in the series for the current
account variable. The KPSS test further rejects the null of stationarity. The failure to
reject a unit root for the current account is a frequent result in the literature testing the
intertemporal model.11 It is commonly argued that the failure to reject the unit root
results from low power of these tests in the borderline case of a highly persistent stationary
processes (see also Cochrane, 1991; Blough, 1992). Similarly, in small samples the KPSS
test often spuriously rejects the null of stationarity when faced with data from a highly
persistent stationary processes (Caner and Kilian, 2001).
Economic theory also provides strong reasons for why the current account should be
stationary. In our model, for instance, the current account variable is stationary if net output
(in first differences) and the consumption based interest rate are stationary, see equation
(3.3.6). Further, since the current account variable is defined as CA∗t = log(NOt)− log(Ct),
a non-stationary current account variable would imply a divergence of net output from
consumption. On a balanced growth path the ratio of net output to consumption should,
however, be constant such that the series for the current account variable should be
stationary. More specifically, our model is consistent with output growing with a linear
trend subject to permanent shocks (e.g. due to technological progress). In this case the
change in net output consists of the trend and the permanent shock. Since we demean
all variables prior to estimating the VAR, the currrent account variable as determined by
(3.3.6) is therefore adjusted for trend growth. For these reasons, we consider the current
account as stationary but highly persistent in our sample.12
However, the high persistence of the current account might be problematic for the k-test.
The reason is that the delta method used to compute the χ2-statistic can be inaccurate and
11See for instance Sheffrin and Woo (1990), Huang (1993), Gruber (2004), Campa and Gavilan (2011) and
Bussiere et al. (2018).
12Other theoretical models in which the current account of a small open economy is stationary include: Gal´ı
and Monacelli (2005a) and Adolfson et al. (2008).
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Table 3.1: Unit root tests
Number of lags 1 3 5
Change in net output (∆no)
ADF -7.795*** -5.441*** -3.91***
PP -12.545*** -12.625*** -12.661***
KPSS 0.077 0.090 0.095
Current account (CA*)
ADF -0.875 -1.004 -0.731
PP -1.305 -1.263 -1.223
KPSS 4.59*** 2.38*** 1.63***
Consumption based real interest rate (r*)
ADF -5.790*** -5.377*** -3.933***
PP -9.131*** -9.159*** -9.122***
KPSS 0.107 0.095 0.103
Notes: range is 1992-Q4 to 2017-Q4. ADF is the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (number of lags refers
to differenced term); PP is the Phillips-Perron test; KPSS is the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin
test (H0: stationarity). Time series are not demeaned, all tests include a constant but no time trend.
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. In calculating r∗ we chose a = 0.36
and γ = 0.047.
could lead to over-rejection but also to over-acceptance of the intertemporal model. For this
reason we prefer the R-test which avoids such problems (see Miniane and Mercereau, 2004,
for both points). This is also confirmed in Bouakez and Kano (2009) who conduct a Monte
Carlo study within the simple intertemporal model using UK data. They show that the
R-test has the appropriate size while the k-test is biased towards over-rejecting. In Section
3.6 we also conduct a Monte Carlo analysis to analyze whether our findings are consistent
with the intertemporal model when it cannot be rejected that a unit root is present in
the time series for the current account. We confirm that the R-test has the appropriate
size. Contrary to the results in Bouakez and Kano (2009), however, in our Monte Carlo
analysis the k-test has a small bias to over-accept the cross-equation restrictions of the
intertemporal model.
3.5 Results
Table 3.2 displays our results for the tests of the intertemporal model, namely the k-test
and the R-test as described in Section 3.3. The results are based on a VAR with one lag.
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Table 3.2: Results of k-test and R-test
Baseline Alternative specifications
(1)
γ chosen to
match variance
with a = 0.36
(2)
Simple
model
r* constant
(3)
higher elast. of
intertemp. subst.
γ = 0.4
(4)
γ chosen to
match variance
with a = 0.25
(5)
just interest rate,
exchange rate
excluded
γ 0.047 - 0.4 0.056 0.047
k-vector
not 0.115 0.092 0.396 0.121 0.122
(0.146) (0.060) (0.296) (0.163) (0.062)
CA∗t 1.001 0.909 -1.887 0.998 0.572
(0.930) (0.375) (1.852) (1.039) (0.387)
r∗t 0.010 - 0.190 0.011 0.084
(0.007) (0.172) (0.009) (0.096)
χ2-statistic 3.64 4.17 3.98 3.26 4.73
p-val. k-test 0.162† 0.125 0.264 0.196† 0.193
p-val. R-test 0.905 0.185 0.000 0.953 0.234
σ
ĈA
∗/σCA∗ 1.00 0.91 1.94 1.00 0.55
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions are for 1991-Q1 to 2017-Q4. Share of tradeables
in consumption, a, is 0.36, unless otherwise stated. β = 0.99. † indicates degrees of freedom equal
to 2 instead of 3, as γ chosen to match the variance of CA∗.
This lag length is suggested by the AIC criterion.13 Each column represents a different
model specification and reports the estimated k-vector, the associated χ2-statistic of the
k-test and its p-value. Further, it reports the p-value of the R-test and the ratio of the
standard deviation of the predicted current account variable, ĈA
∗
, to its counterpart in the
data, CA∗.
The first column is the most important one. It reports the results for the baseline
specification in which the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is chosen such that the
variance of ĈA
∗
equals the variance of CA∗ (as discussed in Section 3.4). Under this
specification neither the k-test nor the R-test reject the cross-equation restrictions of the
intertemporal model. Hence, for the baseline we find that the German current account
data are consistent with the intertemporal model. Further, Figure 3.2 displays the current
account variable as predicted by the cross-equation restriction (3.3.9), that is ĈA∗, and
13Our results are also robust to including more lags. In this case, however, parameter γ has to be adjusted
as discussed in Section 3.4.
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its counterpart in the data, CA∗. The predicted current account variable matches the
data strikingly well—also for the recent period with the large surplus. Hence, the German
current account surplus appears not too large relative to the prediction of the intertemporal
model.
In order to understand whether expectations about net output or the consumption
based interest rate drive the predicted current account variable, we decompose ĈA∗ into
both components. Formally, equations (3.3.6) and (3.3.9) imply:
1 =− Et
∞∑
i=1
βi
∆n̂ot+i
CA∗t
+ γEt
∞∑
i=1
βi
r̂∗t+i
CA∗t
We find that on average 96% of the predicted current account are due to expectations of
changes in net output. This number changes only marginally, if we only consider the average
contribution of net output between 2011 and 2017. In this case net output contributes 95%
of the predicted current account variable. In other words, changes in expectations over net
output play the dominant role in explaining the German current account surplus.
Columns 2-5 of Table 3.2 report results for the k-test and the R-test for alternative
model specifications. In column 2 we report results for the simple intertemporal model
where the consumption based real interest rate, r∗, is constant. Again, neither the k-test
nor R-test reject the intertemporal model. The upper-left panel of Figure 3.3 shows that
the predicted current account variable fits the actual current account variable again very
well. This is in line with the previous result that a time-varying interest rate contributes
relatively little in explaining the German current account.
In column 3 of Table 3.2 we choose a higher value for the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution with γ = 0.4. The R-test clearly rejects the model while the k-test is far from
rejecting the model. The upper-right panel in Figure 3.3 also indicates the poor fit of the
model under this specification.14 Overall we find that the fit of the model is very sensitive
to the choice of γ. However, since the model with constant interest rates fits the current
account very well, we do not consider this sensitivity as problematic.
As a further robustness check, we choose a lower value for the share of tradeables in
consumption with a = 0.25 and report results in column 4 of Table 3.2. In this exercise we
also change the value for γ such that the variance of the predicted current account variable
14This finding strengthens our view that the R-test is better suited to infer the validity of the model, see
the discussion at the end of section 3.4.
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Figure 3.2: Actual German current account variable, CA∗, and as predicted by the cross-
equation restrictions of the intertemporal model, ĈA
∗
, under the baseline parameterization
(see column 1 in Table 3.2).
ĈA
∗
matches the variance of CA∗ (such that this exercise is comparable to column 1 in
Table 3.2). Overall these variations have little effect on the test statistics. Also the fit of
the predicted current account appears to be unaffected by these changes as can be seen in
the lower-left panel of Figure 3.3. Results are also robust to higher values of a (not shown).
Finally, as in Bergin and Sheffrin (2000) we consider the case where changes in the
consumption based real interest rate are only due to changes in the world interest rate
and not due to changes in the relative price of tradables (proxied by the exchange rate
as discussed in section 3.4). Results are reported in column 5 of Table 3.2. Importantly,
we keep parameters otherwise as in the baseline. Again, the k-test and the R-test do not
reject the cross equation restrictions on the k-vector. The lower-right panel of Figure 3.3
shows, however, that the fit of the predicted current account variable worsens. Therefore,
the exchange rate appears to be more important in explaining the current account variable
compared to the real world interest rate.
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Figure 3.3: Actual current account variable, CA∗, and as predicted by the model, ĈA
∗
, for
different model specifications (see columns 2-5 in Table 3.2).
3.6 Monte Carlo analysis
Given the good fit of the current account variable as displayed in Figure 3.2, a concern
is that our results are driven by a potential unit root which we cannot reject in the time
series for the current account variable. To assess this possibility we conduct a Monte Carlo
analysis. For this purpose we simulate data from a stationary intertemporal model and
consider a specification for which we cannot reject that a unit root is present in the simulated
series for the current account. We then perform the k-test, the R-test and compare the
graphical fit of the predicted current account to the simulated time series.
For our Monte Carlo analysis we resort to the small open economy model with a debt
elastic interest rate put forward in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003). The reason to deviate
from the model of Bergin and Sheffrin (2000) is that their model is in partial equilibrium.
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Figure 3.4: Example of the good graphical fit of the current account within our Monte
Carlo analysis for a simulation of 100 periods (as in our empirical analysis). Simulated
current account series, ca (solid line), and as predicted by the cross-equation restrictions,
ĉa (dashed line).
To avoid stochastic singularity and to increase the autocorrelation of the current account
we introduce a shock to the discount factor and a labor supply shock to the model of
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe. The Appendix describes the model and its calibration in detail.
We solve the model and simulate the time series using Dynare (Adjemian et al., 2011).
Each simulated time series contains 100 observations (as in our empirical setting) after
dropping the initial 200 periods as a burn-in phase. We conduct the ADF test on the
simulated current account series and consider 0 to 5 lags of the differenced term when
computing the ADF test. We keep the simulated time series, if the ADF test does not reject
the presence of a unit root at all specified lags (as in our empirical setting). Otherwise we
discard the simulation. We continue with this procedure until we retained 2000 simulations.
On these simulated time series we perform the k-test, the R-test and compare the graphical
fit of the current account to the one predicted by the cross-equation restriction.
We find that the R-test has the appropriate size on the simulated data (5.6% at the 5%
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significance level) while the k-test tends to over-accept the cross-equation restrictions of the
intertemporal model (the rejection rate is 3.2% at the 5% significance level). We further
find that the predicted current account fits the simulated current account very well—as is
the case in our empirical analysis. Figure 3.4 shows an example of the good graphical fit
(which is a general result). Overall, the Monte Carlo shows that our empirical findings are
in line with a stationary intertemporal model and that our tests and graphical comparisons
are working well when the presence of a unit root cannot be rejected.
3.7 Conclusion
It is often argued that the German current account surplus is too large (as we discuss
in our introduction). In this paper we investigate this issue through the lens of the
intertemporal approach to the current account. We find that the intertermporal model
is not rejected for Germany and that the current account surplus is in line with model
predictions. We further showed that the surplus can be rationalized as an increase in savings
in response to expectations of relatively lower future income.
When estimating the intertemporal model we assumed that the time series for the
current account is stationary even though standard statistical tests rejected stationarity or
could not reject the presence of a unit root. We justified our assumption by the difficulty of
these tests to distinguish between the borderline case of a highly persistent process and
a unit root and by economic theory which suggests that the current account should be
stationary. We further conducted a Monte Carlo analysis to assess the possibility that our
results are driven by a potential unit root. In this exercise we generated highly persistent
current account data from a stationary intertemporal model with the feature that it could
not be rejected that the simulated data are non-stationary. Our Monte Carlo analysis
showed that our empirical results are in line with the intertemporal model and hence that
the failure to reject a unit root is not per se problematic.
However, we stress that even if a current account surplus (or deficit) can be justified
by households’ expectations within the intertemporal model, there is no guarantee that
these expectations materialize. As Campa and Gavilan (2011) show in their analysis of the
intertemporal model, Spain’s expectation of future income growth were at its height just
before the financial crisis hit. Further, in order to perform the present value tests of the
intertemporal model one has to compute households’ expectations of changes in net output
over the infinite horizon. These expectations are modeled by a VAR. It is well known, that
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errors due to potential misspecifications of the VAR cumulate at the forecast horizon (see,
for instance, Jorda`, 2005).
Given these caveats, we showed that the large German current account surplus can be
rationalized within the intertemporal approach to the current account. Hence, our results
put the view into question that the German current account surplus is too large.
3.A The model underlying the Monte Carlo analysis
The underlying model of our Monte Carlo analysis is based on the small open economy
model with a debt elastic interest rate in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003). We modify this
model by considering separable utility between consumption and labor and by introducing
a shock to the discount factor (bt) and a labor supply shock (χt). The representative
household of the small open economy has the objective to maximize expected lifetime utility
which is given by:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtbt
(
c1−σt
1− σ + ωχt log(1− ht)
)
(A.1)
where consumption is denoted by ct and labor by ht. Further σ, ω > 0 and β is the subjective
discount factor. Optimization is subject to the following law of motion for foreign debt, dt:
dt = (1 + rt−1)dt−1 − yt + ct + it + Φ
2
(kt+1 − kt)2 (A.2)
where rt is the domestic interest rate which is composed of an exogenous constant world
interest rate r and a country-specific interest rate premium p(dt) = ψ(exp(dt − d¯)− 1) with
d¯ denoting steady state debt. Put differently,
rt = r + p(dt) (A.3)
We assume that the household treats the interest rate premium as exogenous. The purpose
of this premium is to render the model stationary. Further, in equation (A.2) yt denotes
income with yt = Atk
α
t h
1−α
t where kt is capital and At is a technology shock whose stochastic
process is specified below. Investment is denoted by it with it = kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt where
0 < δ < 1 is the depreciation rate. The last term in equation (A.2) represents quadratic
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capital adjustment costs with Φ > 0. Substituting for yt and it in equation (A.2) we get:
dt = (1 + rt−1)dt−1 −Atkαt h1−αt + ct + kt+1 − (1− δ)kt +
Φ
2
(kt+1 − kt)2 (A.4)
Maximizing lifetime utility, (A.1), over dt, ct, ht and kt+1 subject to equation (A.4) yields
the following first order conditions:
btλt = βEtbt+1λt+1(1 + rt) (A.5)
c−σt = −λt (A.6)
ωχt
1
1− ht = c
−σ
t At(1− α)
(
kt
ht
)α
(A.7)
btλt (1 + Φ(kt+1 − kt)) = βEtbt+1λt+1
(
At+1α
(
kt+1
ht+1
)α−1
+ (1− δ) + Φ(kt+2 − kt+1)
)
(A.8)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier. For the shock processes we assume that:
logAt =ρa logAt−1 + σaεa,t (A.9)
log bt =ρb log bt−1 + σbεb,t (A.10)
logχt =ρχ logχt−1 + σχεχ,t (A.11)
where ρa, ρb, ρχ ∈ (0, 1) and εa,t, εb,t, εχ,t ∼ iidN (0, 1). The innovations εa,t, εb,t, and εχ,t
are assumed to be uncorrelated at all leads and lags.
A competitive equilibrium is defined as a collection of stochastic processes {ct, ht, dt, rt, kt,
λt}∞t=0 given initial values d−1, k0 and equations (A.9) – (A.11) such that equations (A.3)
– (A.8) are fulfilled. Once we solved the model, the current account can be calculated by
computing the change in net foreign assets:
cat = dt−1 − dt
We largely follow Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) in calibrating the model. The calibration
is summarized in Table 3.3. The time unit of the model corresponds to one year. We
solve the model and simulate the time series using Dynare (Adjemian et al., 2011). Each
simulated time series contains 100 observations (as in our empirical setting) after dropping
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Table 3.3: Parameter values
r 0.04 As in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003)
β 0.9615 Discount factor, implied by β(1 + r) = 1
σ 9 Low elasticity of intertemporal substitution as in Section 3.4
ω 16.42 Calibrated such that the household works 1/3 of her time in steady state
Φ 0.28 Set to get a high autocorrelation of the current account
ψ 0.0000742 Slightly lower compared to Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) to increase
the autocorrelation of the current account
d¯ 0 As in Bergin and Sheffrin (2000)
α 0.32 As in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003)
δ 0.01 As in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003)
ρa 0.75 Set to get a high autocorrelation of the current account
σa 0.0129 As in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003)
ρb 0.95 Set to get a high autocorrelation of the current account
σb 0.029 Set to get a high autocorrelation of the current account
ρχ 0.95 Set to get a high autocorrelation of the current account
σχ 0.059 Set to get a high autocorrelation of the current account
the initial 200 periods as a burn-in phase. We conduct the ADF test on the simulated
current account series and consider 0 to 5 lags of the differenced term when computing the
ADF test. We keep the simulated time series, if the ADF test does not reject the presence
of a unit root at all specified lags (as in our empirical setting). Otherwise we discard the
simulation. We continue with this procedure until we retained 2000 simulations. Given the
simulated time series, we perform the k-test and the R-test as described in Section 3.3. We
calculate these tests with the values for β and γ = 1/σ which were used in the simulation
(see Table 3.3). As described in Section 3.6, we find that the R-test has the appropriate
size on the simulated data (5.6% at the 5% significance level) while the k-test tends to
over-accept the cross equation restrictions of the intertemporal model (the rejection rate is
3.2% at the 5% significance level).15
15In our Monte Carlo exercise we apply the k- and the R-test as introduced in Section 3.3. As previously
mentioned, the model in our Monte Carlo analysis differs from the one in Bergin and Sheffrin (2000) and
therefore implies a slightly different cross-equation restriction. Since the size of the R-test is correct and
the one of the k-test has only a minor bias, using the cross-equation restriction as described in Section 3.3
seems therefore unproblematic given our calibration.
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